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RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' "STATEMENT OF FACTS
When a federal court certifies questions of state law pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41, the role of this Court is to "answer the legal questions presented without resolving
the underlying dispute." In re Kunz, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (Utah 2004); Spacbnan ex rel Spackman
v. Bd ofEduc., 16 P.3d 533, 534 n. 2 (Utah 2000) ("We will not seek to resolve the underlying
dispute.").
In apparent effort to subvert this standard, Respondents present several "statements of
fact" which do not represent findings of the District Court1 but are based upon the self-serving
summary judgment memoranda and supporting affidavits of Respondents. Brief ofRespondents
at 9-12 (citing almost exclusively from "R.184," Memorandum in Support of Motion For
Summary Judgment of Defendants Mower Brothers, Inc., Scotts Lawn Service, Greenside,
LLC, Kevin D. Bitton and Jean Robert Babilis). While this may be considered accordance
with TruGreen's opening statement that there are relatively few written findings of liability
within the record,3 Respondents' recitation of these "facts" without clarification that many are
disputed is improper and unfairly presents important factual issues in a light most favorable to
Respondents. Notably, the District Court did not just deny TruGreen's summary judgment
motion, but also denied several parts of Respondents' collective motions as well. Feb. 13
Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 34 and 44.
Accordingly, TruGreen preliminarily responds with the following limited clarifications
(though several others could also be made), cognizant of the Court's mandate that it is not here to
resolve the parties' factual disputes:

For convenience, identifying terms described in TruGreen's Opening Brief are
referenced throughout this brief.
Also citing once from "R.193," Memorandum in Support of Ryan Mantz's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
3
Opening Brief of Petitioners at 6.
1

o

The suggestion that this certification is the result of some reactionary measure to

resuscitate TruGreen's damage claim is strikingly incorrect. TruGreen has never argued unjust
enrichment "as an alternative to its failed attempt to prove any lost profits." Brief ofRespondents
at 6. Rather, as addressed to the District Court during the February 28, 2007 hearing, the
argument in favor of recovering Respondents' ill-gotten gains have been, from the beginning, the
essence of TruGreen's claim for damages. Motion Hearing Transcript (Add. No. 2) at 42:2543:14, 45:1-8, 56:17-61:4; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary
Judgment (D. 178) at 30-33 (citing many of the same authorities argued in TruGreen's Opening
Brief, including Natl Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976)). This
verity is reflected in the excluded expert report of Wayne Elggren4 as well as the District Court's
expressed uncertainty regarding dismissal of TruGreen's claims on a lost profits theory:
THE COURT: Here is - 1 think you may - you know, maybe - 1 have got a legal
question and you're making a factual argument. Let me give you this as a way of
crystallizing it. So Mr. Johnson calls as his first witness at trial Stephensen, let's
say. So how much did you sell last year for [Scotts5]? I sold 280,000 or maybe it
is less, you know, but it is some amount. And then he says, okay, judge, that is
our damage figure 280,000. We want restitution. Is he legally entitled to take
Stephensen's sales or maybe you would have to make it profits, let's say the profit
margin on that is whatever so say it is 50,000 in profits. Is he entitled to get that
legally back to [TruGreen] as a restitution for competing when he shouldn't have?
MR. GIBB [counsel for Respondents]: I think the court has answered that in its
prior order [Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order} very expressly no
The Court
knows and has previously ruled, correctly we believe, that the appropriate
measure of damage must consider these other factors
THE COURT: I mean I'm still - let me just bring you back because this is where
I'm getting hung up here. I thought I was ruling on sort of a lost profit damage
calculation expert saying, you know, these folks were competing and it hurt these
4

TruGreen Calculation of Claims (D. 169) at 6 (basing calculation of Scotts' revenue
gains on terms within the employee-Respondents' respective Non-Compete Agreements
and the assumption "that courts have considered the gain achieved by defendants as a
result of defendants' actions as an appropriate basis to determine the amount" of
TruGreen's damages).
5
The District Court mistakenly exchanged references to TruGreen and Scotts in this
portion of the transcript.
2

folks by X amount and I'm saying wait a minute, to do that you have got to take
into account all these other factors.
MR.GIBB: I agree.
T I E COURT: But if they said okay, we're going to simplify it much more. You
made a dollar, you made 280,000 in sales, we should get that as restitution. I
mean where is - does the law allow you to do that?
Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) (Add. No. 2) at 49:4-51:6.
So the way I see things, the question boils down to whether the Utah Supreme
Court would follow the lead of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
cases like National Merchandising Corporation [supra] in recognizing that
theory. And as I read through the cases, I don't see anything that really gives me
much of a feeling for what the Utah courts would do with this. I don't see - 1 see
the rescission case that is Polyglycol being a rescission case which I think is
distinguishable. Robbins v. Finlay and the liquidated damages case that doesn't
seem to speak to that. And Sampson? while talking about loss to the plaintiff,
doesn't seem to foreclose this other theory. If it were up to me, if I were the one
that got to write the law, I would say the Massachusetts court has it right. That
restitution ought to be a reasonable measure of damages. But this isn't a question
for me to decide. It is a question of what Utah law would be and what the Utah
courts would recognize. If I were to rule this second, my thought is that I would
certify to the Utah Supreme Court the question of whether it would follow the
lead of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on this theory.
Id at62:21-63:16.
o

The averment that "Mower Brothers did not ask, direct or encourage any former

TruGreen employees to induce or encourage other TruGreen employees to terminate their
employment or go to work for Mower Brothers" and otherwise did not intend "to harm
TruGreen's business" is based solely on the self-serving affidavit testimony of Respondents
Bitton and Babilis and plainly are disputed "facts" of this case. Brief of Respondents at 9-10.
TruGreen's claims for tortious interference have never been dismissed by the District Court and
are aptly supported in the summary judgment record. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'

6

Authority also relied upon by Respondents in this certification. Brief of Respondents at
29.
n

Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment of Defendants Mower
Brothers, Inc., Scotts Lawn Service, Greenside, L.L.C., Kevin D. Bitton and Jean Robert
Babilis (D. 184) at xxiv (recitation of affidavit testimony of Bitton and Babilis).
3

Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xvi-xxii,fflf44-57 (testimony from former Mower
Bros.' employees regarding Babilis' malevolent efforts to acquire TruGreen management and
veteran sales personnel), and Exhibit B1 (written offer of indemnification to Mantz).
Likewise, the solicitous efforts of Respondents Mantz and Gaythwaite to recruit LeBlanc
and Stephensen in behalf of Mower Bros, and in breach of their Non-Compete Agreements are
preserved in the summary judgment record. Id. at xxix-xxx, xxxix, xliii-xlv,fflf85-88, 135-38,
156-68 (testimony of LeBlanc and Stephensen regarding their recruitment to Mower Bros.).
o

The District Court has never ruled that information received and purloined by

Respondents "is not confidential or a trade secret." Briefof Respondents at 11. Like the tortious
interference claims addressed above, these breach-of-contract claims are the very subject of this
certification and supported in the summary judgment record. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order
(D. 253) at 34; Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178)
at viii-xiv, xxviii-xxix fflf 3-33, 81-84 (description of specialized training and Respondents'
purloining of the same), and Exhibits Bl-5 (coterminous description in Scotts Non-Compete
Agreements that "Confidential Business Information include[es] information relating to research,
products, training, management, marketing and selling.").
o

Respondents evasively suggest that former TruGreen employees named in this

litigation, including those pertinent to this certification, all served in lower level positions at
TruGreen prior to their employment with Mower Bros. Brief of Respondents at 2 ("These
individuals had served in such positions for TruGreen as customer service representative,
auditor, sales representative, or service manager."). In fact, these employees served as branch
managers, branch marketing managers, and veteran sales representatives in the months and years
immediately preceding their employment with Mower Bros. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order
(D. 253) at 5, 9-12; Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D.

4

178) atxxiii-lv.
o

Following the District Court's February 13, 2007 Order, more than "a few

contract claims against a few former employee defendants" remained pending. Brief of
Respondents at 3. Most contract and tort claims against the respective Utah and Idaho
Respondents were left substantially intact from TruGreen's complaint and initial request for
preliminary injunction. Opening Brief ofPetitioners at 3-4 (listing the respective claims pending
against Respondents); Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order at 34.
o

The reality remains that the District Court never disagreed with the basic facts as

first articulated in TruGreen's initial complaint for injunctive relief: (1) the individual defendants
signed unambiguous covenants not to compete in favor of TruGeen; (2) the individual
defendants were targeted and recruited by Mower Brothers; (3) the individual defendants left
TruGreen and went to work for Mower Brothers in violation of their covenants not to compete;
(4) Mower Brother's sales thereafter went up; and (5) TruGreen's sales thereafter went down.
ARGUMENT
I.

Restitution or unjust enrichment is an appropriate measure of damages in this
case for Respondents' tortious interference.
A.

Utah law does not "confirm" Respondents' blanket proposition that lost
profits damages are the exclusive remedy for a tortious interference claim.

Contrary to Respondents' opening arguments and as set forth in TruGreen's Opening
Brief, decisions by this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals which recognize and apply
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979) do not remotely suggest, let alone "confirm," that
damages in a tortious interference case are exclusively confined to lost profits. Brief of
Respondents at 26. This is a misstatement of the law. Indeed, the District Court so indicated
when it certified Question No. 2 to this Court:
And as I read through the cases, I don't see anything that really gives me much of
a feeling for what the Utah courts would do with this
Sampson [770 P.2d 998

5

(Utah App. 1989)] while talking about the loss to the plaintiff doesn't seem
foreclose this other theory [of a measure of Respondents' gains].
Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) (Add. No. 2) at 62:25-63:7. None of the Utah cases relied
upon by Respondents concern the competing interests of an interfering tortfeasor, nor involve
circumstances in which gains of the defendants were even in issue.
In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assoc, Inc., the plaintiff lessee charged that lease
violations and wrongful interference with its business by the defendant assignee had caused it
lost profits damages "in the form of substantial reduction in patronage and revenue." 642 P.2d
1229, 1233 (Utah 1982). The plaintiff did not seek, nor did the Court contemplate, gains of the
defendant as a potential remedy. Id. at 1233-34. In Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt Lake,
the plaintiff leasing corporation brought suit against the defendant bank for tortious interference
and sought recovery of lost profits, claiming "that as a result of the termination of a the financing
arrangement" it had with the defendant, "it could not obtain funds from other sources." 586 P.2d
420, 422 (Utah 1978). Again, the Court was not asked, nor did it examine, any purported gains
of the defendant in assessing damages. Id. And in Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, the plaintiff
land developer sued individual defendants for their interference with a real estate purchase
contract and the increased costs the plaintiff suffered as a result of having to renegotiate a second
contract 116 P.3d 323, 329 (Utah 2005). In "limiting" these consequential damages of the
o

plaintiff "to those incurred as a direct result of the alleged interference, id. at 334, the Court
was not concerned with any pecuniary gains achieved by the defendant, which in fact were none.
Id. at 328 (describing the defendants' motive for interference as furtherance of a "Save our South
Jordan River Valley" campaign).
Likewise, those courts identified by Respondents as "interpreting" Utah law merely
"The damages ADC may recover under this claim are limited to those it incurred as a
direct result of Tobias and Feld's alleged misrepresentations to the Williamses regarding
the existence of a written offer to purchase the property." (Emphasis added).
6

restate Sampson's recitation of Section 774A and do not concern a recovery of the defendant's
gains. Bosshardv. Wagstaff, Case Nos. 90-4062, 90-4068, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16112, *5
(10th Cir. July 16, 1991); U.S. v. Bald Eagle Realty, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Utah 1998)
("Plaintiffs seek to recover the profits they would have earned . . . under theories of fraud [and]
tortious interference with economic relations"). In Sampson v. Richins, the defendant tortfeasor
appealed the trial court's award of consequential and restorative damages for his unlawful
interference in assuming control over the plaintiffs' partnership interests. 770 P.2d 998, 1006
(Utah App. 1989). In assessing these damages under Section 774A, the Court of Appeals
determined that the defendant deprived the plaintiffs "of the use and control of approximately
$290,000," but gave no discussion as to gains achieved by the defendant or whether one could
recover damages based on the defendant's profits. Id. at 1006-07.
Accordingly, these cases do not stand for Respondents' blanket proposition that Utah law
recognizes lost profits damages to the exclusion of any other remedy in a tortious interference
claim. See Sandare Chem. Co. v. Wako Intl., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Tex. App. 1991)
(rejecting defendants' argument that Section 774A and prior rulings on lost profits damages
excluded recovery of the defendant's gains). As authorities from other jurisdictions ruling on
analogous circumstances indicate, notwithstanding a state's adherence to Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 774A and other general tort rules, a recovery of the defendant's gains is a proper
remedy:
[T]here is authority both in the case law and scholarly commentary for the direct
proposition that an unjust enrichment measure is appropriate for willful
interference with contractual relations. Need and reason combine to support this
avenue of recovery, because it will often be difficult to satisfy strictly a
conventional tort formula...
Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76; Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 395 F.3d
921, 925-26 (8th Cir. 2005).

7

B.

Respondents should not be heard to say that an unjust enrichment measure
of damages is unfairly punitive or does not precisely mirror TruGreen's
actual loss.

Chief to Respondents' argument is its assertion that a rigid lost profits measure of
damages for tortious interference is consistent with general tort theory in that a plaintiff must
show causation and actual injury. Brief ofRespondents' at 27. On this basis, Respondents argue
that "[ajwarding unjust enrichment or restitution for tortious acts would not be based on actual
injury sustained by the plaintiff as an actual and proximate result of the defendant's tortious act."
Id. at 27-28. Exposed, Respondents present a variant of the protest unsuccessfully utilized and
directly addressed in Natl. Merchandising "that the unjust enrichment remedy [for willful
interference with contractual relations] is unfairly 'punitive' because the plaintiff may recover
more than his actual loss ..." 348 N.E.2d at 776.
Any requirement, however, limiting a plaintiff like TruGreen to recover precisely only
gains of a tortfeasor that it can show it would have attained absent their interference is
inappropriate in certain circumstances. Id. at 775 n. 10; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §
774A, comment c (;tthe court may, in determining whether the proof meets the requirement of
reasonable certainty, give due weight to the fact that the question was 'made hypothetical by the
very wrong' of the defendant"). In these cases, such as when potentially confounding factors
affect the ready determination of lost profits, Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 23-24, or other
compensable losses may not adequately be recaptured, Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775
n. 10, gains of the interfering defendant may appropriately be recovered as an alternative remedy.
Obviously, to conclude otherwise is to encourage by judicial imprimatur the perpetration of
tortious misconduct.
Here, as with the case of Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 23-24, several factors affect the ready
determination of TruGreen's lost profits, from the effect of its Ogden branch consolidation to the

8

impact of advertising, weather, regional economics, population growth and any other myriad of
causes inherent in—though not unique to9—TruGreen's business. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment
Order at 39-40 (District Court's rejection of TruGreen's expert report on the basis of lost
profits10); Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) (Add. No. 2) at 50:21-51:1 ("I thought I was
ruling on sort of a lost profit damage calculation expert saying, you know, these folks were
competing and it hurt these folks by X amount"). This does not mean that TruGreen has
suffered no real damage or incurred no actual loss as Respondents continue to falsely imply.
Brief of Respondents at 6 (commenting on TruGreen's purported "failed attempt to prove any
lost profits"). To the contrary, and as an explicit backdrop to this Certification,
[T]he [District Court] believes that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages
but that questions remain as to the amount of damages.
Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, given the nature of the interference, including disclosure of confidential
information and solicitation of management employees, it would be inappropriate in these
circumstances to require precise proof that revenues generated by Respondents would have in
fact been made by TruGreen. Mower Bros./Scotts demonstrated ability to skip the learning
curve through a purloining of key management and sales personnel certainly may be considered,
to a significant degree, a compensable loss in of itself. Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775
n. 10; Opening BriefofPetitioners at 33-34.
Accordingly, in this case, Respondents should not "be heard to say that the unjust
enrichment measure is unfairly 'punitive' because [TruGreen] may recover more than [its] exact
9

Exhibits B to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment
(D. 178) (Non-Compete Agreements of employee-Respondents executed in favor Mower
Bros./Scotts: "In the event of breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of the
Agreement, the damages which SLS [Scotts Lawn Service] might suffer would be
difficult or impossible to measure").
Again, a measure of damages not requested by TruGreen. Motion Hearing Transcript
p . 271) (Add. No. 2) at 43:8-14; TruGreen Calculation of Claims (D. 169) at 6.
9

loss . . . " Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 776. TruGreen has no adequate remedy at law in
the form of lost profits damages and can establish - in fact, has established - that the significant
sales growth realized by newcomer Mower Bros, in the immediate months after the mass
departure of TruGreen's employees resulted from Respondents' tortious interference. Contrast
Holmes Products Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 36 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding the
plaintiff unable to establish that the defendant's gains on sales in the market "(something which
[the defendant11] had done successfully for ten years before [the plaintiff] entered the market)
resulted from the interference"). Indeed, rather than attribute Mower Bros.' marked 2006 gains
to its own unsuccessful marketing methods (including, most significantly, direct mail
1 *y

advertising ), Respondent Mantz congratulates an "immensely" improved sales team and sales
managers—all former TruGreen employees—who know how to "maximize every lead" and
increase sales revenues notwithstanding Scotts' marketing methods. Exhibit J to Memorandum
in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) (Reply Add. No. 3); see also
Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) at Defendants'
Response to TruGreen's SOF #50, #51 and #54 (offering no objection to Mantz's email and
content, only that it was not "improper conduct"). If there is any question in this respect, his
email leaves no doubt:
Based on reports from last year and this year's manual tracking of
Inquiries we have substantially less Direct Mail Responses.
• Reports show we have received 3,783 less Inquiries year over year!
• Last year we show we received 7,097 pieces to date Vs. 3,314 this year.
• This is a 53% Drop in Mail Response.
11

Here, the roles are exactly the opposite, with Mower Bros./Scotts (defendant) the
newcomer to the market and TruGreen (plaintiff) the successful veteran. Opening Brief
of Petitioners at 6-7, ^[ 1 and 7. Moreover, as discussed, TruGreen can establish that
Respondents directly benefited from their interference.
See Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment of Defendants Mower
Brothers, Inc., Scotts Lawn Service, Greenside, L.L.C., Kevin D. Bitton and Jean Robert
Babilis (D. 184) at v-vi, ffl[ 5-7 (emphasizing that Mower Bros.' marketing methods are
primarily based on "direct mail advertising that it purchases from Scotts Corporate").
10

•

This has the potential to be devastating to our business

Sales Growth has occurred despite the dramatic drop in Mail Response.
o
As a region we have increased sales revenue 46% over last year.
o Last year we had sold $617,000
o This year we have sold $899,950
o While Inquiries dropped 53% - sales rose 46% - This is a 99% swing in
improvement!
o Our sales team has improved immensely over last year. We could
be going backwards as a business or simply staying flat with 3,700
less Inquiries.
o Take time to pat our Sales Managers on the back. They are really
saving our bacon by teaching these guys how to maximize every
lead....
INSUMMARY:
While we should be very concerned about our current mail numbers, we are
dominating last year's results. If we sold this years low Inquiries at last year's
efficiencies, we would have sold only $288,000. Instead of dwelling on crappy
response rates, we are getting it done as a team.
I want to make sure everyone is aware of the success we are having and warn us
against just talking about our dire response rates compared to last year. Thank
our reys and sales managers for not toning in a $228,000 and getting us to the
near $900,000 mark through February!
Id. (emphasis added). This is the essence of TruGreen's damage claim, Respondents' unfair
benefit, and the very reason why Babilis recruited former TruGreen employees in spite of their
Non-Compete Agreements.
Consistent with TruGreen's Opening Brief, therefore, where lost profits damages are not
readily ascertainable and TruGreen can establish causation and the fact of damages, restitution
should be available to TruGreen against the interfering Respondents.

Opening Brief of

Petitioners at 34-38.
C.

The case of Natl Merchandising specifically presents facts that are analogous
to the facts of this case.

As summarized in TruGreen's Opening Brief, other jurisdictions accept restitution or
unjust enrichment damages in certain circumstances as Respondents aver. Id. at 27-32. Like the
Utah authorities addressed above, many of the cases relied upon by Respondents to prove the
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contrary are inapposite. They are limited in their opinion to strictly an analysis of lost profits
where unjust enrichment was not claimed by the plaintiff43 or where the gains of the defendant
were not even in issue. Id. at 27 n. 18-20. Furthermore, those cases which do address the issue
of unjust enrichment present facts distinguishable from circumstances here and rely on principles
of contract at odds with the mass torts committed by Respondents. Id. at 28-32.
A case much more salient to this one (of which the District Court has already expressed
its approval14) is the Massachusetts opinion of Natl Merchandising. As stated in TruGreen's
Opening Brief, this case specifically confronts the issue of unjust enrichment damages as it
applies to massive breaches of employee non-competition agreements at the behest of a
competing employer. Id. at 19-21. A close analysis of the parties' briefs in that case reveals a
profusion of facts remarkably similar to those here.

Natl Merchandising Plaintiff and

Defendants Briefs (Reply Add. No. 1 and 2).
In that case, Stevens, a former manager and supervisor of NAMCO's telephone directory
cover business, was employed by CSI and its founder Schrom in violation of a consent decree
which prohibited Stevens "from planning, supervising or managing . . . [the] solicitations or
sales" of a competitor. Plaintiffs Brief at 6 and 8. Schrom was admittedly aware that Stevens
had agreed not to compete with NAMCO, but nonetheless employed him as a manager over
CSI's telephone directory cover business with terms of compensation that included commissions
on sales made by all salesman hired after Stevens started work for CSI. Id. at 8. Thereafter, a
number of other former NAMCO sales representatives were also hired by CSI under the
supervision of Stevens. Id. at 10-12.
Following the trial court's finding that Stevens breached the agreement, with the

Respondents' quotation from UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co.,
770 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio App. 2001), for example, is not the holding of that case.
14
Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) (Add. No. 2) at 63:7-10.
12

complete knowledge and consent of Schrom and CSI, the court awarded damages against CSI in
an amount calculated by the total sales that were 'tainted" by CSFs interference. Id. at 17.
Specifically, using Steven's commissions to reverse engineer the total amount of sales made by
CSI under Stevens' management, the trial court awarded an amount equal to "a fair
approximation of the net profits for these sales" based upon margins identified by the parties. Id.
at 17-18.
On appeal, CSI offered arguments similar to Respondents that the trial court could only
have based its award on the loss of sales sustained by NAMCO rather than the wrongful profits
made by CSI in selling telephone directory cover advertisements. Id. at 25; Defendants' Brief
(Reply Add. No. 2) at 9-10. In response, NAMCO offered several authorities and policy
arguments, all adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in rendering its final
opinion:
Considerations of policy also support the measure of damages chosen by the trial
court. There is no doubt that NAMCO was injured by CSFs interference with the
decree. NAMCO and CSI are direct competitors for advertising sales in the New
England states. . . . Theoretically, perhaps, the profits on sales lost by NAMCO
was a measure of NAMCO's damages. On the facts of this case, however, that
measure of damages could not be employed
Unless NAMCO receives some form of compensation for its injury, its rights
under the consent decree are of little value. By inducing Stevens and others to
violate the decree, CSI obtained a sales manager with extensive experience in the
industry and a cadre of salesman already familiar with the product and territory...
In cases such as this, where the injury is clear, but plaintiffs loss cannot be
precisely measured, it is appropriate to invoke the equitable principal of unjust
enrichment and to require the defendant to disgorge the profit derived from his
wrongful conduct.
Id. at 26-28 (citations omitted); Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76.
Similarly, on the facts of this case, where the injury is clear, but where TruGreen's loss
cannot be precisely measured, it would be appropriate to permit an unjust enrichment measure of
damages and require Respondents to disgorge the gains derived from their wrongful conduct.
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Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("the court believes that TruGreen has proven the
fact of damages but that questions remain as to the amount of damages"). Mower Bros, at the
direction of Babilis, procured the employment of Mantz, a former TruGreen branch manager, as
its regional marketing manager. Under Mantz's management, and with the knowledge and
consent of Babilis, Mower Bros, further solicited the employment of numerous employees in
both Utah and Idaho, including branch marketing managers and veteran sales representatives
with extensive experience in the competing products and territories of TruGreen. Opening Brief
of Petitioners at 8-9,fflf10-15. These solicitations included the direct procurement by managers
Mantz and Gaythwaite of sales representatives LeBlanc and Stephensen in violation of their
respective non-interference covenants. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For
Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xxix-xxx, xxxix, xliii-xlv,ffl[85-88, 135-38, 156-68 (testimony
of LeBlanc and Stephensen regarding their recruitment to Mower Bros.). Under Gaythwaite's
management, and in violation of his non-competition restriction, the Mower Bros. Salt Lake
Branch has realized an amount of revenue which Mantz—at least in March 2006—directly
attributes to Gaythwaite's training and supervision. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 13, ^j 27;
Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
LeBlanc, in turn, and in violation of his own non-competition restriction, was the highest
producing Mower Brothers sales representative for 2006. Id. Likewise, under the management
of another former TruGreen employee, Matt Walker, the Mower Bros. Ogden Branch has
realized significant revenues in which Stephensen was also the highest revenue generator for
2006. Id
Permeating this marked sales growth "despite the dramatic drop" in Mower Bros.' direct
mailing are breaches of non-disclosure covenants that remarkably share the same definition of
"confidential information," almost verbatim, as that of Scotts. Exhibits B1-9 to Memorandum in
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Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178). In an industry that heavily relies
upon confidential and experience-tested marketing methods to sell its products (again, as
evidenced by the dollar-per-inquiry analysis of Mantz's email), both TruGreen and Respondents
recognize that damages resultingfromthe breaches of their respective agreements are difficult, if
not impossible, to measure. Id. When a former TruGreen manager or sales representative—-just
like a Scotts employee—is induced to violate the non-competition, non-disclosure, and noninterference provisions of his agreement,15 it can be said that TruGreen has suffered loss even
though TruGreen cannot demonstrate it would have made the same precise gains achieved by
Respondents. See supra at Subsection B. Customers do not need two lawn services and are
effectively "closed" from the market for a period of time even though TruGreen cannot show it
would have sold to each specific customer in fact sold to by Respondents. C.f Intermountain
Eye & Laser Centers, P.L.L.C v. Miller, 111 P.3d 121, 129 (Idaho 2005) ("that employers are
entitled to protect themselves from competition for their existing and past customers cannot
necessarily be extrapolated to mean those are the only customers that an employer can protect").
Under these circumstances, therefore, this Court is justified in following the holding of
Natl Merchandising and permitting the recovery of Respondents' gains for tortious interference.
The injury to TruGreen is clear and the District Court has so found. To allow Respondents
escape from liability on the basis of immeasurable loss (for which the District Court should
probably have granted injunctive relief16) would render TruGreen's rights under the Non-

Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order at 34.
Even so, like Natl Merchandising, the injunctive relief in this case would have been in
many respects too little too late. Plaintiff's Brief (Reply Add. No. 1) at 28. Employees
were already recruited in violation of the non-interference covenants and information
already disclosed. Furthermore, with respect to covenants of non-competition, the
District Court openly expressed reservations about the limited value of imposing a "threeor four-month period" of injunctive relief. Order Denying Motion For Preliminary
Injunction (D. 113) at 7. If there is no disgorgement of gains in a case like this then
Respondents have little to fear of any subsequent Court sanction.
1

15

Compete Agreements of little value. Where TruGreen can identify a measure of gains 'tainted5'
by Respondents' interference that are attributable to precise employees, times, and geographic
areas prohibited by their terms of non-competition an unjust enrichment measure is reasonable.
In an aggravated case where Respondents have deceptively contrived to create the opportunity
for massive breaches of contract by a number of other persons the admonition that Respondents
bear the burden of a "punitive" measure is especially applicable. See Natl Merchandising, 348
N.E.2d at 776. It is after all Respondents' wrongful actions, and not that of TruGreen, that has
led the parties to this juncture.
II.

Disgorgement of Respondents' gains is an appropriate measure of damages
in this case for breach of contract

Courts have developed tools to enable them to enforce contracts when a traditional
measure of damages is unavailable due to uncertainty and difficulty in quantifying the
harm. These tools include liquidated damages provisions and injunctive relief. The
District Court in this case inexplicably declined to award injunctive relief to TruGreen for
the employee-Respondents' contract breaches, suggesting a money damage remedy was
available. The question before this Court is whether a disgorgement measure of such
money damages or no money damages at all is an appropriate remedy here. The Court is
specifically confronted with the question of whether to allow Respondents to breach a
contract without "disgorging" its ill-gotten profits unjustly gained directly from the
breach on some hypertechnical theory.

Of course, to do so would eviscerate the

fundamental purpose of contract law; to hold parties to their proffered and agreed upon
performance. As a policy matter, parties should not and generally are not allowed to
breach existing contracts without consequence whenever a "better deal" comes along.
This case presents a scenario in which a contract breach has occurred, but damages
are difficult, if not impossible to quantify. The case is complicated by the fact that
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generally available legal implements (injunctive relief) created to respond to such
scenarios such as this, are no longer in play. To deny TruGreen any form of relief under
the circumstances would constitute an implicit approval of Respondents' breach. This
implicit approval introduces a dangerous and unwanted element into contract law that
undermines stability and reliability; uncertainty of performance created by inadequate
remedies. Under this scheme, a breaching party has no fear of breaching its duty to
perform if it does so knowing that the breach will return more in profits than the cost of
damages for the breach. This concept is antagonistic, irreconcilable and inapposite to the
very theory of contract law. Yet this is exactly what the Respondents request this Court
to do.
Respondents' approach to the question at hand can be summed up easily: deny
TruGreen any measure of damages. It would be folly to do so. To follow Respondents'
advice would create a scenario under which breach of contract would be deemed
legitimate and even desirable. If parties cannot rely on an agreement to perform in a
prescribed and mutually acceptable manner, of what worth is a contract?
Respondents have cited cases in support of their contention that contract law limits
recovery for breach of contract to a "lost profits" measure of damages. Although this
contention has merit in many breach of contract cases, in certain cases it clearly does not.
It is wholly inapplicable in select cases of breach of non-competition, non-solicitation,
and/or non-interference agreements where the breaching party gains more by breaching
than the damages suffered by the non-breaching party.
A. Limiting damages to a "lost profits" measure of damages is inconsistent
with the contract theory of damages and unsupported by the principles
espoused by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 344 provides for three types of
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damages: expectation, reliance, and restitutionary damages. Section 344 reads:
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect
one or more of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
(emphasis added.) That the "expectation interest" measure of damages and its goal of
putting the non-breaching party "in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed" is understandably the primary remedy in a breach of contract
action is inarguable. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however,
recognized something that Respondents clearly have not; namely, that contract damages
must be flexible in order to properly address a wide variety of factual scenarios. Hence
the secondary remedies of the "reliance interest" measure of damages and the "restitution
interest" measure of damages.
Respondents nakedly advocate for rote and myopic application of damages
principles. Their urging flies in the face of the caveat provided in Section 344 that "[t]he
interests described in this Section are not inflexible limits on relief and in situations in
which a court grants such a relief as justice requires, the relief may not correspond
precisely to any of these interests."

Id. at Comment a.

Restatement (Second) of

Contracts clearly recognizes that there are instances in which justice requires flexibility in
applying the foregoing damages principles.
Such is the case here. Respondents' desire to limit damages to an unavailable
"lost profits" measure of damages is not only convenient but wholly fails to adequately
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address the case at hand, a case in which multiple individuals ha\e chosen to knowingly
and willingly do exactly what they contracted not to do

In essence, Respondents have

chosen to roll the dice in hopes that the damages Lhev inun as it lesull ol thui lespeilhc
breaches are materially less than the profits obtained as a result of the breach.
knowingly
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disgorgement of profits is an appropriate remedy.
Ji, t ase law supports a disgorgemen i I ||ii oil mis nil «»(iniiti
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As Respondents emphasize in their Brief, there is a large amount of case law
illuslialinu thai tin f*\peetation damai'e^

IOII

inn damages and restitutionan damages as

traditionally applied are adequate and sufficient remedies in a majorit} ot eases.
IIOWOUT

lln1 i if od eases arc* not exhaustive, nor are they dispositive of the issue before

the Court. In lack Hie cases cited by Respondents are factually dissimilai tu the present
case and the principles espoused therein (as proposed by Respondents) fail to provide any
meaningful remedy to the situation at hand.

1 hat Respondents nabbed reading oil the

remedies provided b\ the Restatement (Second) of Contracts creates an inequitable result
in this case is be)ond dispute. I hat L M* \AW lias leeogni/i <l (hat si eiuijoi t \i J in n I in h
a disgorgement of profits is the proper remedy is also beyond dispute.
1 he I link il Mates Supreme Cntnl n eogni/etl in
Last Co.* 284 I
Miiihhli i 'inub

i o»f
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448 (1932), that a disgorgement of profits was an appropriate
1 nmpni^ilms dam i°es based on the \ronsdoer\ unjust enrichment.

hi at 456-457. Years later, the Court reaffirmed this principle in Snepp v. United States,
14 i n S ^ i 7 t1<Wi)
In Snepp, the Court confronted the question ot whether a disgorgement of profits
as a measure of damages could be sustained for a breach of an employment contract.
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Frank W. Snepp III was a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent who, as part
of his employment with the government, signed an agreement that stated he would
"not...publish...any information or material relating to the agency, its activities or
intelligence

activities

generally,

either

during

or

after

the

term

of

[his]

employment.. .without specific prior approval by the agency." Id. at 507. Subsequent to
his departure from the CIA, Snepp wrote a book about certain CIA activities in South
Vietnam. He did not submit it to the CIA for prepublication review and clearance as
required by his executed agreement with the government.
The district court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately, and surreptitiously
breached his position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy agreement" and had
deliberately mislead CIA officials into believing he would submit his book for
prepublication review and clearance prior to its public release. Id. at 508. Given Snepp's
calculated breach of his employment agreement, the district court imposed a constructive
trust on all profits from the sale of the book (thereby effectively causing Snepp to
disgorge all profits from the sale of the book). Id. The Court of Appeals accepted the
findings of the district court that Snepp had breached a valid contract, and affirmed the
finding that in so doing, he had caused "irreparable harm" to the government's vital
intelligence activities. The Court of Appeals, however, differed in its opinion regarding
the imposition of a constructive trust and did not award any damages. Id. at 509. The
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Supreme Court instead found that Snepp had a contractual duty to submit his
book for prepublication review if it contained information (classified or otherwise)
gleaned as a CIA officer. Id. Although the district court and the Court of Appeals both
found that the government had been subject to "irreparable harm and loss," (id. at 509-
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510) the Supreme Court recognized that "[n]o one disputes that the actual damages
attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable." Id. at 514, it
then highlighted the laei that, gi\en uvc unquantifiablc nature ol the go\ernmenl s lumi,
a traditional measure of damages was inadequate. Id. It stated, "Nominal damages are a
hollow alternative, certain ... v^iu IL- ,- .

:

-

tinages v.w11 c -*;\ -/v- .. ., /

trial [based on a tori theory of recovery] are speculative and unusual." Id. Instead, the
Coi n I: foi ii id that a coi isti i icti\ e ti list effectively ' prei 'ent ;xi Snepp from beii lg i n yi istly
enriched from his breach of the employment agreement. Id. In explanation, the Court
i,iu\i

•

;

.'<

--M-.""

,

•

disgorge :hc benefits of his

faithlessness [his breach of the employment agreement]... since the remedy reaches only
lunch itfnbufaH

'

Mi

• birarh

il . a,M ,' >addle the former agent with exemplary

damages out of all proportion to his gain." Id. at 515-516.
H-- t; \-ivr.

' \.\iy nr! • '' laid the foundation for a disgorgement remedy for a

breach of contract, but ak>o duWih confronted the argument proposea . . _• ;• .. -jdts
here that the damages awarded be directly proportional to the loss. To avoid the injustice
that this rest lit produces in cases where a bieath liu. ueeuin, d I M
I I damages are
unquantifiable, the Supreme Court linked the damages awarded directly to the breach and
:::e pi.-u^ aer-x-j.. -.*.....

. L.1'

Ill a case with strikingly similar facts, the British Court of Appeal also condoned
!L^>i_" •

'•'-.-••\ v General v.

Although one may argue that Snepp is actually a case based on a breach of a fiduciary
duty, the Court's finding that Snepp owed the government a fiduciary duty was
inextricably linked to his contract. Snepp's breach of his fiduciary duty was a direct
consequence of his breach of his employment contract. That the Court focused on the
resultant breach of Snepp's contractually based fiduciary duty merely indicates that the
Court recognized the unquantifiable nature of the harm done to the government and
fashioned a fitting remedy under an appropriately non-controversial label.
21

Blake [2001] 1 AC 26818 (Reply Add. No. 4), the Court dealt with a former security and
intelligence services officer who was a "notorious, self-confessed traitor" who, after
escaping from prison and fleeing to Moscow in 1966, wrote an autobiography in 1989.
Id. at 1. He entered into a publishing agreement in 1990 with Jonathan Cape Ltd., a
publishing house, wherein he granted Jonathan Cape exclusive rights to publish the book
in return for royalties. Jonathan Cape agreed to pay him advances against royalties. Id.
The book, when published on September 17, 1990, no longer contained any
confidential information. Id. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that Blake's
publishing of the book violated a declaration under the Official Secrets Act signed by
Blake upon entering service for the government. Id. at 2. Similar to the contract at issue
in Snepp, the Court found that Blake was required to first obtain clearance before
publishing his book. Id. By publishing his memoirs without prior approval, Blake had
breached his contract with the government. Id. The Court awarded the government
profits (the royalties due Snepp from Jonathan Cape) directly attributable to Blake's
breach of contract. Id. at 11. In so doing the Court took the opportunity to elaborate on
the state of contract law and its recognition of restitutionary damages and a claim for
profits made from a breach of contract.
The Court prefaced its review by stating that a claim for profits under a breach of
contract theory was only available in appropriate situations. Situations that fall into
broad categories of "skimped" performance and instances where the defendant obtained
his profit by doing "the very thing" he contracted not to do. Id. at 9-10. The Court
reviewed the state of the law with respect to contract damages, noting that damages

Available at http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/biukovic/supplements/Attorney%20General%
20v%20Blake.htm (attached hereto) and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
Idl99900/ldjudgmt/jd000727/blake-l.htm.
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unattached to actual harm were awarded in property cases and a disgorgement of profits
v:i< •

-

'

;

<er veenarios such as unauthorized use of patents, and reached the

following conclusion:
My conclusion is that there seems to be no reason, in principle, why the
court must in all circumstances rule out an account of profits as a remedy
for breach of contract. I prefer to avoid the unhappy expression
"restitutionary damages". Remedies are the law's response to a wrong (or,
more precisely, to a cause of action). When, exceptionally, a just response
to a breach of contract so requires, the court should be able to grant the
discretionary remedy of requiring a defendant to account to the plaintiff for
the benefits he has received from his breach of contract. In the same way as
a plaintiffs interest in performance of a contract may render it just and
equitable for the court to make an order for specific performance or grant
an injunction, so the plaintiffs interest in performance may make it just and
equitable that the defendant should retain no benefit from his breach of
contract.
Id. at 8-9.
1 he Blake Court recognized that "[t]he law does not adhere slavishly to the
•- •*

*mpensatic n foi financially measurable loss.

When the circumstances

require, damages are measured by reference to the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer."
I /. a t 9. Noting that a disgorgement of profits is appropriate in certain circumstances, the
Court implicitly provided some guidelines to determine when an at.

._:„ >r

disgorgement of profits is available Three factors that it identified were: I) The breach
was "cynical and deliberate;' ' 2 ..

: reachii lg par ty, tl lai iks to tl I = I: i eac

enter and entered into a more profitable contract elsewhere; and 3) by "entering into a
new ai id n lore pi ofitable conti act

+;!

contract with the Plaintiff"
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When these factors accompany a breach
• ' '

;

•"• i v remedy. That each of

these factors is present in the case at hand is beyond peradventure.
Hair i, ,i |,ii"" aiii'Miiil "I jeadernic literature on the subject championing the
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cause and rallying for a recognition of a disgorgement measure of damages in contract
(whether it be termed "unjust enrichment," "disgorgement," or "restitution").19 Case law
has caught up with this movement in some instances.

For example, the Colorado

Supreme Court found that a "restitution of profits" was an appropriate remedy in
Earthlnfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (1995).
The underlying facts of this Earthlnfo are as follows. Between 1986 and 1988,
Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Inc. ("Hydrosphere") entered into several software
development contracts with U.S. West, Inc. ("US West") under which it received royalty
payments as well as a fixed hourly development fee. Id. at 116. On February 10,
Earthlnfo, Inc. ("Earthlnfo") acquired US West and agreed with Hydrosphere to honor
Hydrosphere's existing contracts. Id. at 116. Under the contracts, the royalties were to
be calculated "as a percentage of net sales". Id. Both parties fulfilled their obligations
for over a year, but on June 30, 1990, Hydrosphere claimed that Earthlnfo should pay
royalties on new derivative products. Id. Earthlnfo disagreed. Id. On October 30, 1990,
Earthlnfo informed Hydrosphere that it would not pay any royalties on either the main
products or the derivative products while disputing royalties on the derivative products.
Id. Attempts to reach an agreement with respect to the royalties were fruitless and
Hyrdrosphere filed a breach of contract action on January 11, 1991. Id. At trial, the
district court ruled that Earthlnfo did not owe royalties on the derivative products, but
that it had breached its contract with Hydrosphere by unilaterally suspended all royalty

Peter Birks, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of
Law and Equity, 1987 Lloyd's Mar. & Com. L.Q. 421; Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary
Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory, 1 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 115 (2000); Gareth Jones, The Recovery of Benefits Gained From a
Breach of Contract, 99 Law Q. Rev. 443 (1983); Stephen A. Smith, Concurrent Liability
in Contract and Unjust Enrichment: The Fundamental Breach Requirement, 115 Law Q.
Rev, 245 (1999).
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payments on the other products. Id. The trial court ordered that the contract be rescinded
as of June 30, 1990 (the last date that Earthlnfo paid royalties), finding that "the breach
was substantial" and that "due to the nature of the contracts between inc p a i u o a.

,,.e

depth of their disputes, damages would be inadequate." Id The trial court entered final
judgment i^; >i;s:>

v, ... ,^.^i >,-' <i>un^pnci.

-

^'i-cals

I lie Colorado Supiomo * "ouil Inuiul lh;il "whethot ,i |\n1\ llul bi,^.,ii h ;i
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affirmed. Id.

can be required to disgorge to the non breaching party any benefits received as a result of
th : 1: i e a, :1 I" ha :i n : t 1: • = = ii p i: • : > ' ic i isb ' addressed

' 1 1 le C : I n I: affirmed the trial coi trfs

decision, granted rescission (as both parties requested), and ordered restitution. Id. at
-:

disgor^m -

.-f the defendant's gain as

ordered by the trial court. Id. Ihe Court further stated that *;[generally, the mere breach
!

t u e Defendant accountable for benefits thereby obtained,

whether through dealings with a third person or otherwise.. .If, however, the Defendant's
wrongdoing is intentional or substantial or there are no other means of measuring the
wrongdoer's enrichment, recovery of profits may be granted."
added)

In' ,il II1") (unplu^i*

In essence the Court found that a disgorgement of profits was appropriate when

the defendant accrued the pi ofits as a resi ill: : f an

i:;

intentioi lal ' : i

' conscious" and

"substantial" breach. Id. at 120. In the present case, the same can be said.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, therefore, TruGreen respectfully requests that this Court
JV-O«...»
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bw --resented by the District Court.

DATED this 0 ^7day of January, 2008.
.&HANN1

Bria^P^bhnson
William Fv^ngram
Jacob C. Briem
Attorneys for Petitioners
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to I Jtah R , Ann i> 24(a)( 11 )(Ch espies of the following are submitted herewith:
A'ati Mei chandising v. Leyctun nainuii s nnci. .\u\\. Merchandising v

\Jon

Defendant's Brief, Ryan Mantz email dated March 6, 2006, (Exhibit J to Memorandum in
Support of I ': t ::.•;; 1 : : '"' ; I lotion foi * Summary , i udgment (D. 1' ] 8)), and Attorney Get leral \ \
Blake [2001 j = vC 268.
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B R I E F ! OR T i l l \PPI LLI I
NATIONAL MERCHANDISING CORPORA! ION
PROCEEDINGS Bl LOW
This case arises on ap|vaK In I he ikicmlanis I it mi
Mul|imenls entered in two proceedings which were tnctl lotvllui
in the Superior Court One proceeding was .1 peti'ion tor i n i l
contempt brought In National Merchandising i oipoiahon
f % NAMO)"> against I dward J lexden a loimei emplo>%v *»l
NAMCO. for \iolation ol a consent ileciee cnteicd In the
Superior Court o\\ Januan 2u, l%> \*. eniominj* I e\ eu ami
others from compctmt! with NAMCO in a staled aiea until
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September 30. l l )74.l
hiought

hy

NAMCO

The second proceeding was an action
against

Community

Subscribers.

Inc.

C'CSI") and its president and treasurer, Samuel II. Schrom. In
that action NAMCO alleged, in Count I of the Complaint, that
CSI and Schrom knowingly induced Leyden and other former
employees ol NAMCO subject to the consent decree to violate
the decree; and. in Count II, that CSI and Schrom had engaged
in unfair and deceptive sales practices to the injury of NAMCO.
CSI filed a counterclaim in this action, alleging that NAMCO
had also engaged in unfair sales practices.
The trial court, with the assent of the parties, ordered that
Count

I of

consolidated

the
for

Complaint
trial

with

against
the

CSI

contempt

and

Schrom

petition

be

against

Leyden <l Tr. 5-1 L 117-1 18, 229; App. 71 >.- Count II in the

' The papers in the contempt proceeding against Leyden are
captioned "Xational Merchandising Corporation v. I:dward J. Leyden or
"Xational Merchandising Corporation v. Creative Marketing Associates,
Inc. ettf/.," Middlesex Superior No. 33962, Creative Marketing Associates,
Inc. \sas ihe lead defendant in the action which resulted in the consent
deciee. to; violation of which the contempt proceeding was brought
against leyden.

- The record appendix consists of three volumes. The first volume,
captioned "Appendix," contains the docket entries, pleadings, the findings
ol fact and order for decree, the judgment and related papers. The second
and third volumes, captioned "Transcript Volume I" and "Transcript
Volume II," consist of the transcript of the trial testimony. References to
the lirs! volume will be by the letters "App." followed by the page
numhet. References to the second and third volumes will be by the
designation "I Tr." or "II Tr." followed by the page number. Exhibits are
identified by the exhibit number.

The papeis in the Leyden contempt proceeding were not included in
the thiee volume record appendix referred to in the ptevious paragraph,
but will he before the Court in the form of a Supplemental Appendix filed
b> the defendants. References to these papers wilt be made by the
dcMgnahon "Supp. App.," followed by the identification of the paper
ictcircd to.

3
action against ( S I and CSI's counterclaim were deferred until a
later d a t e '
On October 4. Il>?4, alter live da>s ol* trial, the Superior
Court tBeaudrcau. J.) made findings ol fact and an ortlor tor a
decree in favor ol" NAMCO in hoth proceedings (App. 11).
On December 10, l l )74, a judgment was entered in the
action against ( S I and Schrom awarding NAMCO both injunctive relief and damages. The judgment enjoined CSI and Schrom
until January I, ll>7<>:
(i) From employing former employees of NAMCO
subject to the consent decree, whether as employees or
independent contractors, for the purpose of soliciting or
selling advertisements for telephone directory covers or for
planning, supervising or managing such solicitation or sales
in the New I'liglancl states:
(ii) From making payments to the persons subject to
the consent decree based in whole or in part on the
amount of sales of advertising on telephone directory
covers in the New England states:
(hi) From accepting orders or contracts obtained or
negotiated by the persons subject to the decree for
advertising on telephone directory covers received from
the New Fngland states: and
(iv) From accepting orders or contracts for advertising on telephone directory covers received from the New
Fngland states, which ordeni or contracts have been
obtained or negotiated by salesmen whose sales activities
have been planned, supervised or managed by persons
subject to the decree (App. 86-88).

* NAMCO also instituted contempt proceedings against (ieorge S.
Stevens and John Kotoiulo who. hkc l.evden, were former NAMCO
employees subject to the deciee. Stevens and Rotondo, howevei, objected
to a consolidated trial, and then eases weie postponed (I Ir. 20-21.
103-1 20).
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It is noteworthy that the injunction against (SI and
Schrom runs until January I, 197(>, whereas the consent decree
ran until September 30, 1974. In that respect, the judgment
against (\SI and Schrom has the effect of compensating NAMCO
in kind, as it were, for the time lost by NAMCO from the
operative period of the consent decree because of the wrongful
actions of CSt and Schrom.
The judgment against CSI and Schrom also awarded
NAMCO compensatory damages in the amount of S27,462
(App. 88).
Subsequently the Court made an order nunc pro tunc
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54(b) for the entry of final judgment on
Count I only in the action against CSI and Schrom (App. 98).
On December 10, 1974, judgment also was entered on the
contempt petition against Leyden, enjoining him until January
I, l(>7<) "from soliciting or selling advertisements for telephone
directory covers and from planning, supervising or managing
such solicitation or sales . . . [in the New England states)."
The judgment against Leyden awarded NAMCO compensatory
damages of S5,784.26 for Leyden*s violation of the consent
decree (Supp. App., Judgment).
Appeals were duly claimed by the defendants in both
actions (App. 90; Supp. App., Appeal).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Parties

Plaintiff NAMCO, which has its offices and plant in
Nalick. Massachusetts, is engaged in the business of selling
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advertising on plastic covers for telephone directories and of
manufacturing and distributing the covers on which the
advertising appears (1 Tr. I5 ( M60).
Defendant CSl, which has its principal place of business in
Last Rochester, New York, is also engaged in the business of
selling advertising on, and of manufacturing and distributing,
plastic covers for telephone directories (App. 4, 58, 60; I Tr.
31-32, 197-198: 11 Tr. 72-73). CSl also prints a line of paper
products, but these products represent only 2VX of the
company's sales. The remaining 80^ of the company's sales
come from the telephone directory cover business. (1 Tr. 29-30,
50, 162-163; II Tr. 205-211) CSl sells telephone directory cover
advertising in the New England states, and is in direct
competition with NAMCO in these states (I Tr. 31-32, 180;
App. 60, 61,67-68).
Defendant Schrom is the president and treasurer of CSl.
He also is a director, stockholder and founder of CSl, which he
organized in January, 1972. (1 Tr. 197-198) From 1966 until
May, 1971, when Schrom resigned from the company, Schrom
was employed by NAMCO. At the time of his resignation he
was a vice president of NAMCO. (I Tr. 183-184; II Tr. 105, 107,
213)
Defendant Leyden is a former NAMCO salesman (Supp.
App., Petition and Answer; II Tr. 150, 215-216), subject to the
consent decree entered by the Superior Court on January 26,
1973 (Hx. 1; App. 47). Leyden was hired by CSl in early 1974
(II Tr. 150). It is alleged in the contempt petition against
Leyden, and admitted in Leyden*s answer, that in the period
January March of 1974, while the consent decree was operative, he solicited advertising for telephone directory covers on
behalf of CSl from 17 business companies in Connecticut and
made sales to nine of those companies, all in violation of the
consent decree. It is also alleged in the contempt petition, and
admitted by Leyden, that each of the companies solicited by
him had been a customer o( NAMCO. (Supp. App.. Petition
114-6 and Answer)
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Litigation Resulting in the Consent Decree
In mid-1972 Terra nee M. Carter and Irwin II. Schneider,
then employees of NAMCO, organized Creative Marketing
Associates, Inc. ("CMA") to sell advertising on telephone
directory covers in competition with NAMCO. Once CMA was
established, Carter and Schneider left NAMCO, taking with
them 18 other NAMCO salesmen, including Leyden, George S.
Stevens, John Rotondo and Sanford L. Griff (II Tr. 213-218).
In August, 1972, NAMCO brought an equity suit in the
Superior Court for injunctive and other relief against CMA and
the NAMCO salesmen who had joined CMA (1 Tr. 30-31). This
suit resulted in the entry of the consent decree of January 26,
1973, which enjoined certain defendants, including Ley den,
Stevens, Rotondo and Griff, "until and including September 30.
1974 . . . from soliciting or selling advertisements for telephone directory covers, from planning, supervising or managing
such solicitation or sales, and from engaging in the manufacture
or distribution of telephone directory covers, either on his . . .
own behalf or as an agent or employee of any person, firm or
corporation, in 114 states, including the 6 New England
states rU-lx. 1; App. 47).

Summary of the Evidence and Findings Relating to Liability

Neither CS1 nor Schrom was a defendant in the action
which resulted in the consent decree. Nonetheless, Schrom was
informed of the progress of that suit.
In the fall of 1972, after NAMCO had brought suit against
(MA and the former salesmen employed by CMA, Schrom
attended a party given by CMA to celebrate the opening of its
business. At that lime, Schrom was informed by Carter and
Schneider that an action had been brought by NAMCO, and he
was informed further that the defendants in that action had
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agreed to a settlement which would prevent them from selling
telephone directory covers. (11 Tr. 87-88. 101.117-118)
in January, 1^73, Schrom had a meeting with lerrance L.
(Joan, a defendant in the suit by NAMCO against (MA. at
which arrangements were discussed for creating a telephone
directory cover business in Michigan to be run by (ioan. In the
course of that meeting it was said, either by Schrom or in his
presence, that Michigan had been selected because it "was not
one of the states that was in a court order that had been
obtained by (NAMCO) against Mr. Terry Carter and his
complement of people, of which Mr. Goan, Mr. Steven(s|,
land] Mr. Rotondo were all part of."4 til Tr. 183-187)
In early 1073 Schrom received reports from a number of
other former NAMCO salesmen about the disposition of the
action against CM A (II Tr. 98-cW).
In early February, 1073, Arthur M. Sells, president of
MCO, met with Schrom concerning the settlement of
litigation between NAMCO and CS1 then pending in New York,
lawyers for NAMCO and CS1 were present during the meeting.
When Schrom or his lawyer proposed that CS1 sign a settlement
agreement, Sells replied that lie would accept nothing less than
a consent decree of the type NAMCO had obtained in its suit
against CMA in Massachusetts. (Ultimately the New York
litigation was concluded by the entry of a consent judgment
against ("SI and other defendants.) (App. n3. II Tr. 1^0-103.
201-20.*)

Schioui and (inan wcie mistaken m then understanding that (ioan
was .subject to the consent deuce. He was named as a deiendent in the
suit, hni lie was one ol the sewn individual delendents whose assents lo
the deuce weie not icceived. As to these seven defendants, the complain!
was dismissed without picjudice. (I \ . I. * M
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Schrom claimed that he did not learn of the consent
decree entered in the Massachusetts actions until May, 1974,
when he received a registered letter from NAMCO's attorneys
enclosing a copy of the decree (II Tr. 89-94). The trial court,
however, found that "as early as February, 1973, Samuel H.
Schrom, president of CSI, had actual knowledge of the consent
decree entered into on January 26, 1973,% (App, 75).
In September, 1973, Schrom hired Stevens to work for
CSI (I Tr. 301 II Tr. 43). From 1966 until August, 1972, when
he left NAMCO to join CMA, Stevens had been employed by
NAMCO as a manager, planner and supervisor of NAMCO's
telephone directory cover business (I Tr. 54-55, 183-184).
During most of that period Schrom also was employed by
NAMCO (Tr. 1, 184; Tr. II, 105, 107). Schrom hired Stevens
because he knew Stevens had good management ability (II Tr,
147-148). Schrom knew that Stevens had been named as a
defendant in the suit by NAMCO against CMA and, by his own
admission, was aware that Stevens had agreed not to compete
with NAMCO (II Tr. 87-89).
The oral employment agreement between CSl and Stevens
provided that Stevens would receive a commission on all sales in
New England of telephone directory cover advertising made by
salesmen hired after Stevens started work for CSI. Stevens
would not receive a commission on sales made outside New
England or on New England sales by salesmen already employed
by CSl when Stevens joined the company. (I Tr. 56-59,
I 23-125, 1 28: II Tr. 58) Stevens received a 5'/ commission on
the sales of newly hired salesmen until CSI had recaptured the
cost of their training; the commission rate then went up to 10%
(1 Tr. 188; II Tr. 60). Under this arrangement, Stevens received
commissions of $23,199 during the period from September,
1973, when Stevens started work for CSl, nnt\\ the time of the
trial in late September, 1974 (1 Tr. 43-49, 58-59, 90-102,
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121-123, 130-135: 11 Tr. 20-28, 121: t:x. 17). Those commissions represent 8.45'/- of CSl's total sales of advertising on
telephone directory covers in New Hngland during that period,
exclusive of sales made by Stevens directly. s A clear inference
arises, therefore, that Stevens received his commission in the
5-10% range on all, or virtually all. sales in the New hngland
area. Stevens was compensated in the same manner while
employed by NAMCO, i.e., by a commission on the sales of
persons under his supervision, plus a standard salesman's
commission on sales which he made directly, (i Tr. 54-55, 162,
183-184) In states outside of New England CSI sales managers
also receive commissions on sales made by persons under their
supervision (II Tr. 159).
In addition to supervising sales by others, Stevens also
made direct sales of telephone directory cover advertising for
CSI. In the late winter and spring of 1974 he made 15 direct
sales of telephone directory cover advertising on Cape Cod,
fully aware that he was acting in violation of the consent
decree. (I Tr. 38-39, 7 8 , 8 1 , 147-1 52: II Tr. 50-51; Exs. 13,14)
From October through December, 1973 CSl's Massachusetts
office was located in Stevens' home in Braintree (I Tr.
170-171). In January, 1974 the operation was moved from
Stevens1 home to a newly rented office in Waltham (1 Tr. 139:
II Tr. 54). The rental checks for the Waltham office are signed
by Stevens (1 Tr. 141). CSI reimburses Stevens for the expense
of the Waltham office and for other CSI operating expenses
5
CSl's total New England sales of telephone directory cover
advertising in the period from October, 1973 to September, 1974,
exclusive of sales made by Stevens directly, were $274,62! (App. 77; II
Tr. 28; Ex. 17). Sales of telephone directory cover advertising made by
Stevens directly in that period produced commissions to him of
$1,487.50. Dividing that figure by the applicable commission rate of 35Cv
(25% standard salesman's commission, plus Stevens' lOVr override)
discloses that the total sales made by Stevens directly were S4,250. (1 Tr.
57-63, 78, 81-83; II Tr. 25; Ex. 17) CSI's total New England sales of
telephone directory cover advertising in that period, therefore, were
$278,871 ($274,621 +$4,250).
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paid by him (11 Tr. 20-23). Training classes and sales meetings
for (Si's telephone directory cover salesmen have been conducted at the Waltham office, in Stevens' presence (i Tr.
144-146). In early 1974 Stevens attended a sales meeting
concerning the telephone directory cover program held at CSTs
headquarters in Mast Rochester (II Tr. 187), On one of his trips
to Hast Rochester in the spring of 1974, Stevens returned some
telephone directory covers which in his opinion were of poor
quality (II Tr. 62-63, 163, 172).
Stevens and Schrom testified that Stevens was employed
by CSI to work in CSTs paper products division only and that
Stevens did not plan, supervise or manage the sale of telephone
directory cover advertising by others (I Tr. 174-174; II Tr.
122-125). The trial court made the following finding with
respect to their testimony: 'irrespective of the alleged terms of
that employment, to which I give no credence, I find that
George Stevens, with the complete knowledge and consent of
Samuel H. Schrom and C.S.I., planned, supervised and managed
the sales of vinyl plastic telephone directory covers in the
proscribed New England States during the proscribed period of
time'* (App. 74) [emphasis added).
In February, 1974, CSI hired defendant Leyden, also a
former NAMCO salesman subject to the consent decree (II Tr.
47-48, 150). Thereafter Leyden received commissions of $5,784
from CSI for sales of telephone directory cover advertising
made by him in New England (U Tr. 47-48, 94-95). Leyden was
given a business card which identified him as area manager of
CSTs "paper products division", but his sales efforts were
confined exclusively to telephone directory covers, which are
part of CSI's plastics division (II Tr. 155-157: Ex. 19).
Obviously, the misleading business card was designed to conceal
the fact that Leyden was acting in violation of the consent
decree (App. 76). Schrom claimed that he was unaware of
Leyden's activities until May, 1974, when he received a letter
from NAMCO's attorneys and learned "much to I his] regret"
that Leyden's employment by CSI was in violation of a court
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order (II Tr. cM-^2). ( S l \ records showed, however, that
l.eyden received weekly commisMons on telephone directory
cover sales in New 1 ngland continuously from the tune lie
started work for (SI until late September. Il>74. just betore the
start of the tri;il. when he was sent In ( SI to (ieorj»iah til Ir.
46-49.94-95:1 x 17).
John Rotondo. also a former NAMCO salesman subject to
the consent decree, was hired by CSI in November. 1973 (I It.
33-34; II Tr. 4546; 1 \. 17). Rotondo has received commissions
of S 10.339 from CSI for sales of telephone directory cover
advertising made by him in New Ingland (II Tr. 30-31). As in
the case of l.eyden. Rotondo received weekly commission
cheeks on New lingland sales of telephone directory cover
advertising from the time he started work for CSI until late
September. 1974, shortly before the commencement of the trial
(II Tr. 4546; Ex. 17). Thus. CSI continued to pay Rotondo for
activities which violated the consent decree even after Schrom
received the letter in May. 1974 informing him of the decree's
terms7 (II Tr. 97-98, 158; Ex. 20).
Sanford L. Griff, also a former NAMCO salesman subject
to the consent decree, was hired by CSI in October, 1973. The
decision to hire Griff was made by Stevens, as was the decision
to hire Rotondo. (I Tr. 33-34; 11 Tr. 46; Ex. 17) I:rom October.
1973. until May. 1974, when he left CSI. Griff received

"Leyden never appeared at the trial, despite the fact that the
contempt petition against him was being tried together with the action
against CSI and Schrom. Just before the trial, and after receipt of a letter
from NAMCO's attorney requesting that Leyden, among others, be made
available as a witness. CSI sent Leyden to Georgia. Schrom maintained
that he had no knowledge of how to reach Leyden in Georgia, although he
admitted that CSI knew where to send Leyden his weekly paychecks. (1
Tr. 10-11:11 Tr. ^5. 131-134, !35-!3o: l:x. 18)
^ Rot undo also was sent to Georgia by CSI just before the trial and
did not appear at the trial, despite the request of plaintiffs attorneys that
he be made available as a witness til Tr. 133134. I 3 5 - I 3 O ; Lx. 18)
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commissions from (SI of $2,470 for sales of telephone
diicclory cover advertising in New I ngland (II Tr. 31-32; I \.
17).
In the action against ("SI and Schrom, the trial court
found, on the issue o\' liability: That "George Stevens, with the
vomplele kin-a Inhv and consent of Samuel II. Schrom and
( SI . planned, supervised and managed the sales of vinyl
plastic telephone covers in the proscribed New I ngland States
during the proscribed period o\' time": that "George Stevens
from the inception of his employment with C.S.I, in September
1 c>73 until September 18, 1974 v/as knowingly in violation of
the terms and conditions set forth in the Consent Decree": that
"as early as February 1973, Samuel II. Schrom, President of
C.S.I., had actual knowledge of the Consent Decree entered into
on January 26. i973 M ; that "at the time JFdward J. Leyden]
became associated with C.S.I
Samuel H. Schrom, President
of C.S.I., knew of the Consent Decree, and knowingly
employed Leyden to solicit advertising for vinyl plastic
telephone directory covers in the proscribed area of New
Lngland during the ensuing months of 1974 until September
18, 1974": and that with "full knowledge of the 1973 Consent
Decree. Samuel II. Schrom. President of C.S.I., knowingly
continued George Stevens in the managerial capacity of sales of
advertising for vinyl plastic telephone directory covers and
intentionally interfered with the rights of NAMCO in the New
Ingiand States during the proscribed period, as stated in the
Consent Decree, and that said activity injured the legitimate
business interests of NAMCO" (App. 74-76).
In the contempt proceeding against Leyden, the trial court
found, on the issue of liability, that "Fdward J. Leyden
intentionally violated the terms of the Consent Decree in that
he solicited advertising for telephone directory covers in the
proscribed area . . . . jam!) that the foregoing intentional
violations did injure the legitimate business interests of
NAMCO" (App. 76).
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Summary of the livkience and Findings Relating lo Damages

NAMCO attempted to obtain production of ('SI records as
evidence at the trial, but its efforts wore strenuously resisted by
(SI.
Prior to trial. NAMCON attorney wrote CSTs attorney,
requesting the production ot specified books and records (II Tr.
134, 135-136; l x . 18). At trial. Schrom testified that he was
unable to produce the records requested because they had been
"stolon" from CSTs offices in last Rochester four days after
NAMCXVs attorneys mailed the letter requesting production of
documents (I Tr. 3-5, 198-204). 8 When asked what type of
records CS1 kept showing total sales in a particular area. Schrom
replied that there was a "town How book" in which all sales in
particular programs were recorded. That record, Schrom
testified, was among those that had been stolen just before the
start of the trial. (I Tr. 200-202) When asked what other records
were available showing sales by areas, Schrom replied tUSt it
would be necessary to refer to the original contracts between
CSI and its customers (I Tr. 199-200, 205-207). Production of
those contracts was requested, but the defendants' attorney
objected on the ground that it would be necessary to use "a
trailer truck." At that point the trial judge said that he was "not
going to entirely accept all this testimony here because it's a
little too difficult for me to d o . " and he said it would be
necessary that CSI produce the contracts, even " i f it takes a
truck." (\ Tr. 208) It then developed, in further testimony by
Schrom, that there were other records, referred to as
"collection forms," which had not been stolen and which
contained all the information that appeared in the town flow
book U Tr. 20<>-215). The trial judge ordered CSI to produce
the collection forms, cancelled checks for payments to

^NAMCO served ;i subpoena duces locum on Stevens at CSI's
Waltham office calling lor the production of the same documents. At trial.
Slovens produced one copy of a CSI newsletter. (1 Ti 74-75. I \ . 7).
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salesmen, contracts with customers, and the cash disbursements
journal ( I T r . 217-223).
Schrom objected to the production of ('SI records on the
further ground that they contained trade secrets which should
not be disclosed to a competitor, lie objected to the productio 1
of the cash disbursements journal because it would disclose the
names of (\SI\s suppliers and the prices at which ('SI buys. S:or
the same reason he objected to the production of whatever
records would show CSTs profit or loss (because they would
disclose CSTs "purchase power"), lie also objected to the production of records of CSTs telephone directory cover programs.
because those records would disclose the names of CSfs
customers. The trial judge assured Schrom that arrangements
would be made to protect the confidentiality of whatever
business records were produced. (I Tr. 223-228)
In order to protect the confidentiality of records produced
by CSl. the trial judge appointed Richard Leavitt, a certified
public accountant, as "an impartial examiner in the nature of a
Master or Auditor" to examine the CSl records in conjunction
with counsel for the parties (I Tr. 245-248). Leavitt. who had
been engaged originally by counsel for NAMCO, was instructed
by the trial judge to consider himself impartial, to cooperate
equally with both counsel and to submit his bill for services to
the Court for payment (I Tr. 245-246). Leavitt was instructed
that "any information obtained (by him I shall be held in
absolute confidentiality | by him | and shall be released and
revealed only to the extent authorized by this Court/' and he
was further instructed to turn all work papers in to the Court at
the conclusion of his examination (I Tr. 246-247).
The CSl records examined by Leavitt, pursuant to the
confidentiality order by the trial judge, consisted of the
following: (i) a schedule of checks drawn by ( S I payable to
former NAMCO salesmen subject to the consent decree; (ii) a
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copy of ( SFs cash disbursements journal, hy which the
schedule of checks could he verified, (ni) accounis receivable
ledgers (referred to by Schroin as "collection forms") fur
telephone directory cover programs in New I ngland during the
period of Stevens' employment by (SI; and (iv> accounts
receivable ledgers for 'Mown book" programs ((SFs paper
products division) in New I ngh.Mul during the period of Stevens'
employment by (SI lll'lr. 4-13).
Schroin and Stevens both denied that there was any record
in existence itemizing the commissions paid Stevens. Leavitt
therefore was forced to refer to other records to calculate the
commissions paid Stevens for supervising the sale of advertising
on telephone directory covers. First. Leavitt reviewed the
schedule of checks (as amended by reference to the cash
disbursements journal), which disclosed that Stevens had
received a total of S40.222 from CS1 from September. 1973 to
September. 1974, including reimbursement of expenses, commissions on telephone directory cover programs and commissions on town book programs. Accepting as correct information
from Schroin that approximately $10,000 of this sum was
reimbursement for expenses/* Leavitt concluded that Stevens'
commission income from CSI was S30.222. (1! Tr. 20-23)

The payments to Stevens identified in (SFs cash disbursements
journal as reimbursement of expenses come to $2,130(11 Tr. 41-43).
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l.eavitt nest eliminated From Stevens* total commission income
the amounts received by Stevenson the town hook programs.10
I ea\itt then reduced commission income further hy deducting
the amount oF commissions received hy Stevens For sales of
telephone directory rover advertising made by him directly (II
I I 23-28). In this manner l.eavitt was able to arrive at the
commission income leceived by Stevens From CSI on sales of
telephone directory cover advertising made by others, which he
determined to be S23.1 W HI Tr. 26-28. 121).
Having derived the total commissions paid Stevens For sales
of directory cover advertising made by others, Leavitt compared
that amount to CSTs total New Hngland sales of telephone
directory cover advertising during the period that Stevens was
employed by ('SI, exclusive of sales made directly by
Stevens.'1 That comparison showed the overrides represented
8.45' ( of OSFs total sales (11 Tr. 28-29). a percentage which
clearly indicates that Stevens received his override, varying
from 5-10'-r, on all of CSTs New lingland sales of advertising on
directory covers during the period that he was employed by
( S M I tr. 28).
' " The accounts receivable ledgers, both for the town book
ptograms and the 'clephonc directory cover programs, identified each sale
by dollar amount and by sales-nun. Since the salesman's commission rale
was known, it was an easy matter lo calculate the amount of commissions
received by Stevens For sales made direedy by him, both of town book
covers and telephone directory cover advertising. Stevens received an
override commission on all town book sales by others in New lingland.
The override rule \m town book sales was fixed so it was also an easy
matter to calculate the amount of oveirides leceived by Stevens on town
book sales (II Tr S I 3. 2.*-2h) No other method of particularizing
Stevens' commission income was available, because Schrom and Stevens
boilt denied that ihete were arccouutiug records in existence that would
explain tne comvnissio.i payments made lo Stevens (I Tr. M-7| % 203,
220-222). Since Slocifs* overrule commission rale varied on telephone
ducci'uv covei adve/iisin^ smiles (between 5-I0V), it was not possible to
denve his overrides ov. diose sides from the accounts receivable ledgers.
The only wa> to calculate those overrides was to eliminate the other
{ascertainable) commissions from !ns lotal commission income, as was
done by I eavilt.
See In. 5, supra.

17
Leavitfs examination disclosed that Stevens received
override commissions from ( S I on N27K,N"| on telephone
directory cover advertising sales in New l-ngland.1 - Since those
commissions were paid to Stevens tor planning, managing and
supervising those sales, as the trial judge found lApp. ^4). it
follows that CSPs sales in that amount were tainted by (Si's
knowingly inducing Stevens and others to violate the consent
decree entered in favor of NAMCO.

As noted above, Schrom strenuously resisted production
of CSTs profit and loss records on the ground that they
contained confidential information. He testified further thai
CSI does not maintain profit and loss records on particular
programs. In order to calculate profit or loss on a segment of
CSr.s business (such as New l-ngland sales of telephone
directory cover advertising), Schrom said, it would be necessary
to start at the beginning and refer to original (and voluminous)
records of CSTs costs for manufacturing the covers, administering the programs, delivering the completed covers, and the
like. (1 Tr. 224-226) With respect to the company's business as
a whole. Schrom testified that CSI was operating at a profit and
that the profit level was approximately 5'v of sales (II Tr.
205-21 I). Arthur M. Sells, president of NAMCO, testified that
NAMCO was operating at a profit level of 8-1 S'i (II Tr.
1^3-1%).
In the action against CSI and Schrom. the trial court
found, on the issue of damages, "that the sum of $27,462
awarded as compensatory damages represents ten percent o!

- Sec fn. 5, supra.
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s274.h2l.1M.1-* which is the total of all telephone directory
cover sales exclusive of the direct sales of George Stevens for
the New I ngland area" and "that this ten percent factor is a fair
approximation of the net profits for these sales" (App. 77).
In the contempt proceeding against Leyden. the trial court
found, on the issue ol damages, that "from I'ebruary ll>74 until
September 18. Il>74 I dward J. Lcydt n received from CSI
weekly commissions totaling S5.784.26, exclusively for sales of
advertising | on ] vinyl plastic telephone directory covers, all in
contravention to the Consent Decree" (App. 76). 1 4

' * As noted before (fn. 5, supra) the total New England sales,
including those made directly by Stevens, were S278.871. The trial court
used the lower figure, which omits direct sales by Stevens, in calculating
die fair approximation of net profit.
14
The total amount of Lcyden's commissions was established by
l.eaviu's examination of CSI's books (II Tr. 47-49). It should be noted
thai ("Si's books showed more sales by Leyden than he admitted in his
answer. This perhaps explains why CSI sent Leyden to Georgia before
inal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS
CSI AND SCHROM INTENTIONALLY INDUCED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSENT DECREE.

An intentional violation of a legally protected interest
subjects the wrongdoer to liability for the injury he causes.
drammenos v. Zolotas, 356 Mass. 594, 597 (1970); Ross v.
Wright, 286 Mass. 269, 271 (1934) and cases cited; Restatement
of forts. §766 comment b. In this Commonwealth, the tort of
intentional interference with legally protected interests has been
recognized in cases involving rights under a written contract,
II. D. Watts Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co.. 260 Mass.
599 (1927), employment agreements terminable at will, Berry
v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353 (1905), the right to conduct a
lawful business, Godin v. Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 350 (1920), and
an expectancy under a will, Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520,
527 (1907). If the law protects an expectancy under a will from
intentional interference, as in Lewis v. Corbin. then a fortiori
the law should protect NAMCO's rights under a decree of the
Superior Court against interference by a competitor.
Defendants Schrom and CSI do not deny that deliberate
interference with the operation of the consent decree would
subject them to tort liability. Rather, they argue that, "There
was no evidence to support a finding that Schrom or C.S.I,
intentionally induced or persuaded either Stevens or Leyden to
breach their agreement [sic) with NAMCO" (Defendants'Brief
at 8). This argument evinces a somewhat cavalier disregard of
the evidence.
Despite Schrom's protestations to the contrary, it is clear
that Schrom knew of the terms of the consent decree long
before he hired Stevens. Leyden. or the other salesmen subject
to the decree. Schrom first learned of the lawsuit against the
former NAMCO employees and of the settlement negotiations
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then underway in the fall of 1972, when he attended a party
\ii\cn by CM A. He had further discussions concerning the
consent decree in January, 1973 with Terrence Goan and with
olhcr salesmen subject to its terms, and there is evidence that
Schmm sent Goan to Michigan to avoid the decree's reach,
finally, the decree was discussed in Schrom's presence in
February, 1973 during negotiations between CSI and NAMCO
concerning the settlement of litigation pending in New York. (II
Tr. 87-88, 101, 117-120, 183-187, 190-192, 201-203) On the
basis of (his evidence, the trial court made a specific finding
that "as early as February 1973, Samuel H. Schrom, President
of C.S.I., had actual knowledge of the Consent Decree entered
into on January 26, 1973" (App. 75).
Since Schron knew of the consent decree, he and his
corporation, CSI, were under a duty to refrain from interfering
with it. Grammenos v. Zolotas, supra at 597. The trial court
concluded that Schrom had ignored his duty to respect the
decree and had, in direct violation of its terms, hired George
Stevens to manage CSI's sale of advertising on telephone
directory covers in New England (App. 74-75).
The Court's finding is supported by the following facts,
among others: Schrom and Stevens worked together for a
number of years at NAMCO, where Stevens held a supervisory
post similar to his position at CSI (I Tr. 183-184); Schrom was
familiar with Stevens5 reputation, respected his management
ability, and wanted him available "for future growth patterns*'
(II Tr. 146-147); CSI paid Stevens' way to a meeting in
Rochester in September, 1973, at which Stevens was hired (I
Tr. I 58); after being hired, Stevens set up a CSI branch office at
his home in Brain-tree (I Tr. 170-171); Stevens was present
during sales training sessions in CSI's Waitham office and
attended a meeting of CSI's sales managers in early 1974 at
which policies for the sale of advertising on telephone directory
covers were formulated (I Tr. 144-146; II Tr. 187); Stevens
engaged in direct sale of advertising on directory covers himself
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on al leas! fifteen occasions (II I r. 51): ami Stevens reeei\eil
"override" commissions on virtually all of the telephone cover
programs sold hy (Si in New I ngland. the same method ol
compensation used by both NAMCO and ("SI for their sales
managers (I Tr. 54-55, Id2; II Tr. 15°>. !5
During the period from September, I*>73 to September.
1974 CSI paid Stevens $23,199 (exclusive of commissions on
direct sales), Rotondo 510,339. Leyden $5,784, and (iriff
S2.740 for sales of advertising on telephone directory covers
made in violation of the consent decree (II Tr. 26, 30, 32. 48).
Coupled with this evidence were strong indications that
CSI and its employees deliberately attempted to conceal the
extent of their violation of the consent decree. For example,
Leyden was given a business card identifying him as manager of
CSFs paper products division even though his efforts were
confined exclusively to sales of vinyl telephone directory covers
(II Tr. 155,156; Exh. 19). Schrom initially failed to produce the
records requested by NAMCO on the grounds that the records
had been "stolen" in a mysterious theft which occurred four
days after NAMCO mailed its request for production of
documents, a tale which the trial court found "a little too
difficult for me to [accept)" (I Tr. 3-5, 198-204, 208). Stevens
'^ Schrom and Stevens testified that the override commissions paid
to Stevens were not for services, but were in the nature of a "bonus", to
ensure Stevens' availability for CSTs telephone directory cover programs
when the consent decree expiied (I Tr. 174-175, II Tr. 123-125. 147448).
That testimony simply was not credible. If the understanding was that
Stevens would receive a guaranteed amount, as Schrom suggested (II Tr.
124), the amount would not have been computed as a percentage ol sales.
If the understanding was thai CSI would pay Stevens to the extent it had
I he financial ability, and that its financial ability was measurable by the
volume of its business, there was no occasion to limit the commission to
sales in New Lngland. When we consider, further, thai the commission
arrangement applied only lo sales made by persons hired after Stevens
went lo wo'k foi CSI. and that the commission rate increased alter the
salesmen had been tiained. the explanation given by Schrom and Stevens
becomes piogressivcly less credible.
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make an independent examination of (Si's records, and report
his findings. Leavitt reviewed CSl's accounts receivable ledgers,
its cash disbursements journal, and a schedule of checks paid by
CSl to persons subject to the consent decree. He reported his
findings at length to the Court, and the worksheets showing his
computations were admitted as Exhibit 17. (I Tr. 245-246: II
Tr. 4-39). CSl now objects to the admission of Leavitfs
testimony and computations on the grounds that his testimony
was based on hearsay (Defendants' Brief at 11-12).
The short answer to CSl's objection is that it was not
raised at the trial. Although formal exceptions have been
abolished, it is still necessary that a party make known to the
Court "his objection to the action of the Court and his grounds
therefor. . . ." Mass. R. Civ. P. 46; See Mass. R. App. P. 2(a).
During the trial, the Court inquired at length concerning the
defendants' position on the admissability of Leavitt's testimony, but the sole objection raised was based on relevance not
hearsay (II Tr. 16,32-39).
Even if CSFs hearsay objection were properly before this
Court, it would be without merit. In cases involving voluminous
financial records, it is accepted practice to permit a bookkeeper
or accountant to review the records and to summarize their
contents. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 352 Mass. 636, 643
(1967); Commonwealth v. Greenberg. 339 Mass. 557, 581-582
(1959); Boston and Worcester R.R. Corp. v. Dana. I Gray 83,
104 (1854); Cabel v. United States. 113 F.2d 998, 1001 (1st
Cir., 1940). It is not necessary that the records themselves be
admitted in evidence; it is sufficient that the records would be
admissable if offered, and that they are available in the
courtroom for cross-examination. Cornell-Andrews Smelting
Co. v. Boston and Providence R.R. Co.. 215 Mass. 381, 390-391
(1913): Commonwealth v. Warner, 173 Mass. 541, 548-549
(1899); Dyecraftsmen, Inc. v. I'cinberg. 359 Mass. 485, 487
(1971); 4 Wgmore% Evidentv § 1230 (Chadboum Rev. 1972).
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Both prerequisites were satisfied in this case. The testimony of defendant Schrom, who was Treasurer of CSI,
established that the records examined by Leavitt were kept in
the ordinary course of CSl's business and would have been
admissable under G.L. e.233 §788 (I Tr. 210-218). These
records were available in the courtroom in the event that CSPs
attorneys wished to cross-examine; in fact, under the trial
court's protective order, they never left CSl's custody, if there
were any errors or discrepancies in Lcavitt's computations, CSI
could easily have produced the records themselves. Rather than
confront Leavitt with the records, defendants deliberately
waived cross-examination (11 Tr. 52). Indeed, Schrom testified
specifically that he did not dispute Leavitt's figures (11 t r . 98).
The hearsay objection therefore is without merit. CornellAndrews Smelting Co. v. Boston and Providence R.R. Co., supra
at 391.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSESSED DAMAGES AGAINST CSI AND SCHROM BASED ON THE
PROFITS MADE BY CSI IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSENT DECREE. IN THIS CASE, DAMAGES BASED
ON CSFS PROFITS ARE ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT
NAMCO'S RIGHTS UNDER THE DECREE.
After finding that CSI and Schrom had intentionally
induced Stevens, Leyden, and others to violate the terms of the
consent decree, the trial court turned to the question of
damages. The Court's starting point was the fact that Stevens, in
violation of the decree, had planned, managed and supervised
CSl's sales of telephone directory cover advertising in New
England. The fruits of this conduct were gross sales of 5274,621
in the New England states (App. 75-77). Schrom denied that
there were any records showing CSl's profit margin on these
New England sales, but he testified that CSI in general made a
net profit of approximately 5V< (II Tr. 205-21 I). The profits of
NAMCO, a direct competitor of CSI in the New England
market, range from H'A to I5tf of gross sales (II Tr. 193-196).
On this record, the trial court found that 10V of gross sales
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represented a lair approximation of ( S l \ profits on ihc sale oi
advertising on telephone directory covets in the New I uulaiul
states, and he awarded 10'.; of .s:74.o:i. or SJ7.4h_\ as
compensatory damages <App. 77).
Defendants object to the trial court's finding on damages
on the grounds that there can he no award for "speculative and
conjectural profits" (Defendants' Brief at (M. There is, however,
no need for absolute precision in the computation of damages; a
reasonable approximation is sufficient. Romhola v. Cosindas.
351 Mass. 382, 385-386 {1966); Dalian v. DemosHros Central
Contractors, 334 Mass. 377, 378-379 (1956); Matuxhiia Mectric
Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp,, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345;
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
< 1931); See Goddard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345.
350 (1946). The trial court's findings represent a reasonable
approximation of CSFs New England profits and therefore are a
proper measure of damages. It is significant, for example, that
Stevens had been planning, managing and supervising sales of
telephone directory cover advertising for more than six years
when he went to work for CS1, and that CSI, at that time, was
less than two years old (I Tr. 183-184, 198). It is reasonably
inferable that CSl's New England division, under the management of Stevens, was operated more efficiently and more
profitably than the company's business as a whole. 16
Defendants also attack the trial court's findir^s on
damages on the ground that the court should have based its
award on the loss of sales sustained by NAMCO. rather than the
wrongful profits made by CSi in violation of the decree
(Defendants' Brief at 9-10). In support of this objection.
^ It is noteworthy that CSI claimed that the prices al which it buys arc
lower than the prices at which NAMCO buys and that its numufacturing cost
is less (I Tr. 226; II Tr. 35). To the extent that profit is affected by costs.
CSI's profits could be expected to exceed NAMCO's profits, which were in
the 8-15'/ range (II Tr. 195-1%).
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dclcndanls cite / / / ) Waits Co v. American Horn/ it; Mortgage
(<>. 2(A) Mass. 5l>9 (I 1 ). 1 ?), a case involving wrongful interlerence wiilj contractual relations, and i.ujkin.s\s Real Tstatc,
hu v. he/;//, 34*> Mass. 343 ( |9<>5). a suit to enforce restrictive
covenants in employment agreements.
In cases involving oilier types of interference with legally
protected interests, however, the courts have awarded damages
based on the wrongdoer's unjust profits rather than the injured
party's loss. This principle has been applied in trademark cases,
Reading Stoveworks v. S. M. Howes Co., 201 Mass. 437.
441-443 <1909). cases involving unfair methods of competition
such as "palming o f f . luster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co.,
21 1 Mass. 219. 223 ( 1912). and civil contempt proceedings to
enforce judicial decrees. Lemon v. Krentler-Arnokl Hinge Last
Co., 284 U.S. 448. 455-457 (1932); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden
Rule Appliance Co, 252 F.2d 467, 470. 471 (2dCir. 1958);
Gillette Co. v. Two Guys From Harrison, Inc., 36 N.J. 342, 177
A.2d 555.560(1962).
The present case is closely analogous to civil contempt
proceedings like Leman v. Krentler-Arnokl Co., supra, where
compensatory damages were measure J by the wrongdoer's
illegal profits rather than the injured party's pecuniary loss.
Although Count ! of the complaint against CSI and Schrom was
cast in terms of tortious interference with the consent decree,
the same evidence would have supported a finding that the
defendants were in contempt of court for aiding and abetting in
the violation of the consent decree. Commonwealth v. Town of
Hudson. 315 Mass. 335, 347 (1943); Aires v. Braintree, 341
Mass. 6, I 2 (I960); Cf Mass. R. Civ. P. 71. Since the wrong is
the same under either theory, a similar measure of damages
should apply.
Considerations of policy also support the measure of
damages chosen by the trial court. There is no doubt that
NAMCO was injured by CSTs interference with the decree.
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NAMCO and CSI are direct competitors for advertising sales in
the New Ingland slates. At least .some of ('Si's sales were made
lo former customers of NAMCO; I c\i\^\\ has admitted as much
{Supp. App. Petition <; b and Answer). Theorchcallv. perhaps,
the profit on sales lost by NAMCO was a measure of NAMCO's
damages. On the facts of this case, however, that measure o\'
damages could not be employed.
In the first place, NAMCO's loss of sales is not measurable
because of the nature of the telephone directory cover industry.
Companies which sell advertising on telephone directory covers
normally do not compete for the same customers on a day to
day basis. Rather, il is customary for a company to select an
entire community for distribution of a directory cover, then
solicit advertisements from merchants who market their products and services in that community. When sufficient advert iscments have been sold, the company prints the directory cover
and mails it free of charge to all householders within the
community, on the expectation that they will put the covers on
their telephone directories. (App. 5, 60) Obviously, householders are unlikely to use two covers on the same directory, so
the sale of a telephone directory cover "program" in a
community effectively closes that community to competition
until the information on the cover becomes obsolete. When CSI,
in violation of the decree, sells a directory cover program in
Sandwich, Massachusetts, or Windsor, Connecticut, as it did in
this cased Tr. 152; Supp. App. Petition. Answer), it can be said
with certainty that those towns are closed to NAMCO for a
period of months or years, even though NAMCO cannot
demonstrate that it would have sold advertising to each
merchant solicited by CSI within those towns.
I-ven if it were possible to identify sales lost by NAMCO.
that procedure could not have been followed in this case
because of the confidentiality protection insisted on by ( SI and
granted by the trial court. Because the details of CSTs
telephone directory cover programs {including the names of
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customers and even the names of communities in which the
programs were sold) could not be disclosed to NAMCO. there
was no way in which NAMCO could have adduced evidence of
the direct el feet of (Si's activities on Namco.
Unless NAMCO receives some form of compensation tor
its injury, its rights under the consent decree arc of little value.
By inducing Stevens and others to violate the decree, CSl
obtained a sides manager with extensive experience in the
industry and a cadre of sidesmen already familiar with the
product and the territory. It took NAMCO almost I 2 months to
detect the violation, file suit, and obtain a preliminary
injunction.17 if the only risk in this type of conduct is the
possibility of an injunction if and when the wrong is discovered,
then companies such asCS! have little reason to fear the Court's
decrees. Indeed, if the wrongdoer in a case like this is not
ordered to disgorge his profits, there is no incentive to comply
with the Court's injunction, because in that event the only
sanction (if the wrongdoer is caught) is repetition of the
injunction with which he has already interfered.
In cases such as this, where the injury is clear, but
plaintiffs loss cannot be precisely measured, it is appropriate to
invoke the equitable principle o r unjust enrichment and to
require the defendant to disgorge the profit derived from his
wrongful conduct. Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance
Co . 252 F.2d at 470: Gillette Co v. Two Guys From Harrison,
Inc , I 77 A.2d at 560: Restatement of Restitution § I, comment
e.

1
' Schiom hired Stevens as CSI's icgionul sales manager in late
Septembei, 1973 (II Tr 20.124). The piclimmury injunction in this case
vwtscuicicU on Scplcmbci 6, 1^74 (App. 54).
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSESSED DAMAGES AGAINST LEYDEN BASED ON THE COMMISSIONS HE EARNED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSENT
DECREE.
In his Answer to the Petition for Contempt. Leyden
admitted that he had sold advertising on telephone directory
covers in violation of the consent decree, that the merchants to
whom he sold advertising were former customers of NAMCO,
and that his activities had deprived NAMCO of the reasonable
expectation of further business in the Connecticut Valley area
and had injured NAMCO\s goodwill in that area (Supp. App.
Petition % 6, Answer). Leyden claimed that he ceased his illegal
activities once he was served with the Petition for Contempt
(Supp. App. Answer), but CSLs records showed that Leyden
continued to receive commissions through September. 1974 on
sales of advertising on telephone directory covers in the
proscribed area (II Tr. 4 6 - 4 9 ; Ex. 17). Leyden did not appear
at trial, offered no evidence, and made no attempt to
demonstrate that any portion of his commissions were attributable to sales outside the forbidden territory. The trial court
therefore imposed a civil fine on Leyden in the amount of the
total commissions he received from CSL or 55,784.26 (App.
78).
Leyden now attacks the Court's award on the ground that
the fine should have been measured by the pecuniary injury
suffered by NAMCO as a result of his disobedience, citing
Department of Public Health v. Cumberland Cattle Company.
Mass. Adv. Sh. (lc>72) 1031 (Defendants' Brief at 12). No
doubt the injury caused by Leyden's disobedience is one
possible measure of damages. However, as the cases discussed in
Part III, above, demonstrate, a fine based on the profits
obtained in disobedience of the decree is also appropriate in
civil contempt proceedings. Lemon v. K rentier-Arnold Co..
supra at 450> 457; Sunbeam Corp. v. Colden Rule Appliance
Co., supra, (iUlette Co. v. Two Cuys from Harrison, Inc., supra
An award based on the wrongdoer's wrongful profit* is
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particularly appropriate in this case, where Leyden has admitted
that his illegal activities injured NAMCO's goodwill. See
Sun/warn Corp. v. (iolden Ride Appliance (V>.. supra at 470
(recovery based on unjust enrichment appropriate in cases of
injury to goodwill).
Leyden also argues that a fine based on his commissions
rather than NAMCO's lost sales is punitive rather than compensatory, and should not be allowed in a civil contempt
proceeding (Defendants' Brief at 12). This precise contention
has been raised and rejected in a number of civil contempt
proceedings. Leman v. Krentler-Amold Co., supra at 456-457;
Sunbeam Corp v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., supra at 470;
Gillette Co. v. Two Guys from Harrison, Inc., 177 A.2d at 560.
As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Leman v.
Krentler-Amold Co., courts of equity have traditionally awarded compensatory damages based on the wrongdoer's unjust
enrichment. 284 U.S. at 456-457. The fine assessed against
Leyden conforms to this well-established principle of equity
jurisprudence and therefore should be upheld.
V.

THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AWARDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT WAS APPROPRIATE TO VINDICATE THE
COURT'S DECREE AND RESTORE NAMCO TO ITS
ORIGINAL POSITION.

Besides ordering defendants to disgorge their wrongful
earnings, the trial court also granted NAMCO injunctive relief.
CS1 and Sehrom were enjoined until January 1, 1976 from
employing persons subject to the consent decree for the
purpose of selling advertising on telephone directory covers or
supervising such sales in the New England states (App. 86- 88).
Leyden was enjoined until January 1, 1976 from selling
advertising on telephone directory covers and from supervising
such sales in the New England States (Supp. App., Judgment).
All three defendants object to that portion of the judgments
(Defendants' Brief at 11, 13).
(SI and Sehrom rely, incorrectly, on United Auto Supply
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Co., Inc. v. A mam. 346 Mass. 625 (1964). That case held thai,
in a suit to enforce an agreement not to compete, the injunction
should run for the period of time originally agreed upon by the
parties. 346 Mass. at 628. It should be noted that the original
consent decree entered on January 26, 1973 conformed to this
principle. However, the action against CSl and Sehrom is not a
suit to enforce an agreement among the parties; it is a suit to
enforce a decree of the Superior Court whose operation
defendants have deliberately disrupted. Whatever may be the
rule in actions to enforce private agreements, it is clear that the
Superior Court has ample power to take whatever steps are
necessary to enforce its own decrees. Commonwealth v. Town
of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 346 (1943); Nigro v. Conti, 319
Mass. 480, 484 (1946); Department of Public Health v.
Cumberland Cattle Co., supra at 1044.
CSl and Sehrom also urge that the injunction should not
have prohibited dealings with all the persons named in the
consent decree because only one individual, Leyden, appeared
to be in contempt of that decree (Defendants' Brief at 11). In
fact, however, the record shows that George Stevens, John
Rotondo, and Sanford Griff were also in contempt of the
decree (II Tr. 45-46, 50-51; Exh. 17). In addition, there was
evidence that CSl frequently hired former NAMCO salesmen,
including some who were parties to the suit brought against
CMA but were not subject to the consent decree (II Tr. 99-100,
186, 214-215). In view of the scope and flagrant nature of CSPs
interference with NAMCO's rights, a broad injunction, covering
all of the salesmen subject to the January 26, 1973 consent
decree, was appropriate.
Finally, Leyden objects to the terms of the injunction
granted against him, arguing that, 4,lt would be more reasonable
to enjoin |himj for the same number of days as his violation
continued" (Defendants* Brief at 13) This argument is based on
the assertion that Leyden's violation ceased sometime in June,
1974 (Defendants' Brief at 13; Supp. App. Ans.). CSl's records,
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however, indicated that Leyden was still being paid commissions on the sale of advertising on telephone directory covers in
the proscribed area up to the date of trial in September, 1974
(II Tr. 47-49). Leyden did not appear at the trial, and offered
no evidence. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly
may have interpreted Leyden's absence as an attempt to
foreclose inquiry into the extent of his violations of the decree.
CJ. (irady v. Collins Transportation Co., Inc.. 341 Mass. 502
(I9(>0). One who deliberately violates a decree, then icaves the
Commonwealth to avoid searching scrutiny of his conduct, is in
no position to haggle over the terms of the contempt order
entered against him. See Goddard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319
Mass. 345,350(1946).
In the last analysis, defendants' arguments must fail
because they misconceive the role of injunctive relief. The trial
court's objective was not merely to nullify particular illegal acts,
see Laine v. Aamio, 265 Mass. 374, 377 (1928), but rather to
accomplish the objectives of the original consent decree. To
achieve these ends, the Court could "adopt all necessary,
reasonable, and lawful means.1' Nigro v. Conti, supra at 484;
Juhimille v. Jubinville, 313 Mass. 103, 108-109 (1943);Herbits
v. High Speed Process Printing Corp., 358 Mass. 817 (1971).
The original consent decree entered January 26, 1973 granted a
period of grace during which competition from the salesmen
who had left NAMCO's employ to form CMA was enjoined. In
fact, the evidence demonstrates that, for at least 12 months, a
group of these same salesmen competed directly with NAMCO
\n the proscribed territory at the instigation of CSI and 3chrom.
A decree forbidding CSI from employing persons subject to the
decree for a period approximately equal to the offense was an
appropriate means of vindicating the consent decree and
protecting NAMCO's rights. The type of "irresponsible and
contumacious conduct" involved in this case compels broad
remedial relief. Dept. of Public Health v. Cumberland Cattle
Co., Mass. Adv. Sh. (1972) 1031, 1044. Only by awarding
money damages and granting injunctive relief can the Court
make it not worth the risk to interfere with its decrees.
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Conclusion
lor the season given above
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Statement of the Issues.
1. Whether the plaintiff has sustained the burden of
proving that tJie defendants intentionally induced or pi
cured a breach of the consent decree,
2. Whether the court erred by measuring damages as
in an action for breach of contract.
3. Whether the court erred in enjoining the defendants
from hiring or accepting any orders from the individuals
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named in the consent decree for a period of time beyond
the terms of that original decree.
4. Whether the expert witness, Richard Leavitt, appointed by the court, could provide by hearsay the only
evidence of the gross sales of C. S. I.
5. Whether the damages and injunction levied against
Edward J. Leyden for contempt of court were excessive
and unreasonable.
Statement of the Case.
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an action in tort brought by the plaintiff, National Merchandising Corporation ("NAMCO")* against
the defendants, Community Subscribers, Inc. ("C. S. L " ) ,
and Samuel H. Schrom ("Schrorn ,, ) > by complaint dated
August 26, 1974 (A. 3). It alleged that the defendants
have deliberately and maliciously interfered with the rights
granted to the plaintijBf under a consent decree entered
January 26, 1973, by inducing certain employees named
in said decree to violate the provisions of an injunction
contained in said decree in order for the defendants to
obtain the benefits of the services of those employees (A,
6). The complaint sought damages and an order restraining the defendants from said interference (A. 6).
II.

COURSE OP PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND DISPOSITION.

The case was heard in Middlesex County Superior Court
on September 24 and 27 and October 1 and 2, 1974, before Boudreau, J. Although the complaint contains two
counts, this case was heard, and judgment entered, on
count I only. Count I I and the counterclaims of the defendants are to be heard at a later date. Also joined for
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trial was the contempt proceeding against Edward J.
Leyden—equity case no. 33962, Middlesex County Superior Court (Ex. 1, Tr. I 27).
The judge issued his findings of fact and order for decree (A. 70) on October 4, 1974, in which he found, inter
alia, that the defendants "intentionally interfered with
the rights of NAMCO in the New England States during
the proscribed period, as stated in the Consent Decree,
and that said activity injured the legitimate business interests of NAMCO*' (A. 75). The court assessed damages against the defendants, C. S. I. and Schrom, in the
amount of $27,462 dollars and ordered the defendants
to be as follows:
"enjoined from employing or continuing to employ,
whether as employees or independent contractors, any
of the persons subject to the Final Decree in Equity
No. 33962 for the purpose of selling or managing or
supervising the sale of advertising on telephone directory covers in the New England States. . . .
" I t is further Ordered that the Defendants . . . are
enjoined from accepting orders or contracts for advertising on telephone directory covers received from
the New England States, which orders or contracts
have been obtained or negotiated by said persons subject to said Final Decree of January 26, 1973'f (A.
78).
The court also ordered the defendant, Edward J. Leyden,
to be as follows:
"enjoined from soliciting or selling, directly or indirectly, advertisements for telephone directory covers;
from planning, supervising or managing such solicitation or sales in all of the New England States.
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Said injunction shall be in effect until January 1,1976.
11
It is further ordered that the defendant Edward
J. Leyden pay to NAMCO the sum of $5,784.26 as
compensatory damages of violating the Consent Decree set forth in Equity No. 33962" (A. 78).
After hearing, judgment was entered on December 10,
1974, revising only the period of the injunction against
the defendants. Said injunction is now to run until Jannuary 1, 1976 (A. 86-88).
The defendants filed their notice of appeal to the courts
finding of fact and order of decree on October 24, 1974,
and ti' a* notice of appeal to the entry of judgment on
December 27, 1974 (A. 80, 89).
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,

The defendant Samuel II. Schrom, from Pairport, New
York, is president, treasurer, and founder of the defendant 0. S. I. The corporation, officially organized in January, 1972, has at all times been in the business of selling
and manufacturing plastic telephone covers and in the
manufacture and printing of various paper products (Tr.
I 197-198).
The corporation retains outside salesmen who are independent contractors without employment contracts (Tr.
I 219-220). Each salesman may elect his own area in which
to work, and each is subject to no field supervision from
the corporation. The income of the salesmen is based solely upon the percentage of the sales made. None of the
salesmen are controlled by the corporation in the hours
worked. They are not carried on workmens compensation or group insurance. No Social Security or federal
income tax is withheld from the commission by the corporation. Commissions paid by the corporation are re-
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ported to the federal government through a federal 1099
form, not a W-2 form (Tr. II 137-140).
In November, 1972, George Stevens, Edward J. Leyden,
John RotondOj and others totalling 17 persons entered into
a settlement agreement with their former employer, National Merchandising Corporation, for entry of a final consent decree enjoining the former employees from soliciting
or selling advertisements for telephone directory covers;
from planning, supervising, or managing such solicitation
or sales; from engaging in the manufacture or distribution of telephone directory covers, either on their behalf
or as an agent or employee of any person, firm, or corporation in several states, including the New England
states (Exs. 2, 3, 4, Tr. I 27-28). The injunction was entered into January 26, 1973, and was to expire on September 30, 1974 (Ex. I, Tr. I 27). Mr. Samuel Schrom had
no knowledge of the consent decree until May 1, 1974 (Tr.
II 91-92).
In September, 1973, George Stevens and Sam Schrom
met to discuss employment for C. S. I. The parties agreed
that Stevens would create a new division of C. S. I., known
as the Paper Products Division of New England. The
purpose of this employment was to create a market for
the items of paper-printed materials (Tr. I 187, II 123126). In October, 1973, Stevens began operating the paper
products division from his home in Braintree, Massachusetts, where he also operated his own business as G S S
Advertising (Tr. I 29-35). The arrangement for commissions between Stevens and 0. S. I. was that Stevens would
bo paid 5 to 10 per cent of all business that came out of
New England. The commissions would be payable to
Stevens as a consultant of new products (Tr. II 124). The
consultant fee payable to Stevens and based upon a percentage of business was the result of an arrangement
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whereby Stevens would receive some monies when it was
available from profits earned through sales made by all
salesmen in the New England area. If Stevens would
accept this arrangement, he would receive not less than
$25,000 dollars per year (Tr. II 124). In November and
December, 1973, Stevens hired two people as salesmen for
the "Paper Products Division" (Tr. 1 33).
In January, 1974, C. S. L opened an office in Waltham,
Massachusetts, which both the "Vinyl Telephone Book
Cover Division" and "Paper Products Division" could
use as a base of operations (Tr. I 176). Arleen Survello
was in charge of the "Vinyl Telei>hone Book Cover Division" (Tr. I 50-51). Although both divisions used the
same oflice, they were mutually exclusive in their operation. George Stevens conducted sales meetings at the
Waltham office for the purposes of paper products only,
and never engaged in, or conducted, any supervision, training, or sales meetings of the vinyl telephone book cover
business (Tr. I 177). The only meeting where the vinyl
telephone book cover business was discussed took place
in January, 1974, in the East Rochester office of C. S. I.
(Tr. II 187). In February or March, 1974, Stevens, without knowledge or consent of Schrom or any officers of
0. S. I. (Tr. I 178), made sales of vinyl telephone book
covers on Cape Cod amounting to $3,911 (Tr. II 50-51).
TTpon learning of the sale, Schrom became "extremely upset" and told Stevens that he had violated the agreement
(hat had been made as a man-to-man agreement in October
1973 (Tr. I 179).
In April or May, 1974, Schrom first learned that the
agreement entered into by Stevens and others with NAMCO
was, in fact, a consent decree or court order. This knowledge was obtained by letter received from counsel for the
plaintiff, dated May, 1974 (Tr. II 91), Schrom was not
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aware that an individual named Leyden was in his employ (Tr. II 92). The books, records, and documents available to 0 . S. I., reflecting all the sales made by C. S. I.
salesmen in all divisions and demanded by counsel of the
plaintiff and the court, were produced by Schrom. All
documents were put into the possession of Richard Leavitt,
a member of the accounting firm of Price-Waterhou.se, who
had been appointed as " I m p a r t i a l E x a m i n e r " with the instructions of the court to do an audit of the sales of C. S. 1.
in New England from September, 1973, to September, 1974
(Tr. I 246-251). Leavitt\s calculations revealed the gross
sales of 0. S. I. in the New England area to be $274,000
(Tr. II 29). The commissions paid to Mr. Rotondo totalled
$10,33!).6« (TY. I I 31); commissions paid to Mr. Leyden
totalled $5,784.26 (Tr. IT 48). Of all the sales made by
0 . S. I., the total amount paid to Stevens by 0. S. I. was
$30,222.65 (Tr. I I 26). It was estimated that 80 per cent
was attributed to vinyl telephone book covers (Tr. 209),
with an approximate operating profit of 5 per cent. (Tr. II
210-211; Ex. 17, Tr. I I 39).

Argument.
1.

T H E PLAINTIFF I S NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY AOAINST
THE DEFENDANTS SCHHOM AND C.

S. I.

BECAUSE I T HAS

NOT SUSTAINED THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE D E FENDANTS INTENTIONALLY INDUCED OR PROCURED A BREACH
OF THE CONSENT DECREE.

I t was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the
defendants intentionally and maliciously interfered with
the legally protected interests of the plaintiff, and the damages sustained by that interference. McGurk v. Cronenivctt, 199 Mass. 457 (1908).
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There was testimony from the defendant Schrom and
from the witness Stevens that Schrom had knowledge in
September, 1973, of an agreement between Stevens and
NAMCO (Tr. II 89-91), that Stevens was not to sell any
vinyl plastic telephone book covers until October 1, 1974
(Tr. I 164). Stevens was instructed by Schrom to refrain
from violating that agreement (Tr. I 178-179). Both parties, therefore, created a new division known as the "Paper
Products I)ivision ,, in which Stevens would work to create
a new market (Tr. I 187, Tr. II 123-126). Leyden was
unknown to Schrom. Although Schrom had heard that a
person named Leyden was also signatory to an agreemehwith NAMCO not to compete, he had no knowledge that
Leyden was working for 0. S. I. until he received a letter
from counsel for the plaintiff revealing that fact (Tr. II
92). It is submitted that although a breach of the agreement by Stevens and Leyden with NAM00 did occur on
or about February and March, 1974, it vras without the
knowledge, consenl, or direction of the defendants, Schrom
or C. S. I. There was no evidence to support a finding
that Schrom or (\ S. I. intentionally induced or persuaded
either Stevens or Leyden to breach their agreement with
NAMCO.
This was the conclusion of the court below *'firrespective of the alleged terms of the employment [between
Schrom and Stevens], to which I give no credence . . . "
(A. 74). The facts, however, do not support that conclusion. Although the court is not required to believe the
testimony of the defendant Schrom, or the witnrss Stevens,
even though such testimony was uncontradicted, the court's
disbelief ie not the equivalent of proof of the facts to the
contrary. Mcmiscalco v. Director of Division of Employwent Security, 327 Mass. 211 (1951). There can be no
liability from a mere knowledge of the contractual rela-

9
tion between other parties without any evidence of the inducement or persuasion to breach that contract. Sweeney
v. Smith, 167 Fed. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1909). Grammenos v.
Zolotas, 356 Mass. 594 (1970).
II.

THIS IS AN ACTION OF TORT, AND DAMAGES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN MEASURED ACCORDINGLY; THE COURT ERRED BY MEASURING DAMAGES AS IN AN ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The court computed the damages assessed in the amount
of $27,462.00 against the defendants, C. S. I. and Schrom,
by applying an approximation of 10 per cent net operating profits to the approximate gross sales of the defendants of $274,621.93 in the New England area (A. 77).
In the case of II. D. Watts Co. v. American Bond and
Mortgage Company, 260 Mass. 599, 613 (1927), the court
held that the damage recoverable for inducing a breach
of contract is " 'the loss of advantages, either of property or of personal benefit, which, but for such interference, the plaintiff would have been able to attain or enjoy.* [Citing cases.]" In such a case, it was held, the
damages assessed are not for the breach of contract, but
for tort, and include such loss of profits as the plaintiff can
prove resulted directly and proximately from the wrongful acts of the defendant. Further, the damages must be
capable of ascertainment by reference to some definite
standard, either of market value, established experience,
or direct inference from known circumstances. Unless the
amount of the plaintiff's loss is so established, and substantial damages were proved with reasonable certainty,
there could be no recovery for "speculative or conjectural
profits."
The court computed the damages against the defendants
in this case by using the method of computing damages in
an action for breach of contract rather than for tort. In
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an action for damages as a result of a violation of a covenant not to compete, the plaintiff would be entitled to prove
damages in an action for breach of contract by showing
a loss of profits that he would have received had the covenant been obeyed. However, even in those instances, it
has been held that where there was " 'no showing that
any of the fees would have been paid to . . . [the plaintiff J
if . . . [the former employee] had not been in business, or
what part of any particular fee represented loss profit
(o [the plaintiff],' " then damages have not been proved,
but left to speculation. Lufkin's Heal Estate, Inc. v. Aseph,
:J49 Mass. 343, 34fi (1965). Snelling £ Snelling of Mass.,
Inc. v. Wall, 345 Mass. 634 (1963).
Evidence of the court's error in computing damages in
this case is clearly demonstrated when the court cited
Coyne Industrial Laundry of Schenectady, Inc. v. Gould,
359 Mass. 269 (1971), as authority for its computation of
damages (A. 77). The Coyne Industrial Laundry case
was an action on a breach of a covenant not to compete
and damages assessed for breach of contract. Therefore,
the measure of damages was quite different from the measure of damages on an action of tort for intentional interference with contractual relations.
III.

JUDGMENT ENJOINING THE DEFENDANTS FROM HIRING,

OK X\CCEPTING A N Y ORDERS FROM THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED
IN THE CONSENT DECREE UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1976,

WAS

BEYOND THE TERMS OF T H A T DECREE W H I C H RESTRICTED
THE EMPLOYEES FROM COMPETING U N T I L SEPTEMBER

20,

1974.
The court, in addition to assessing damages against
C. S. I. and Schrom, has enjoined 0. S. I. from employing
or accepting any orders of vinyl plastic telephone book
covers from any of the individuals named in the consent
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decree of January 26, 1973. Said injunction is to continue until January 1, 1976.
It appears, from the record below, that the only individual to be in contempt of the consent decree of January 26,
1973, was Edward J. Leyden. The court has, in effect,
extended the term of the injunction against each individual listed in the consent decree to January 1, 1976, without benefit of hearing or finding of contempt—save Edward
J. Leyden. To restrain C. S. I. and Schrom from employing or accepting orders from these individuals is tantamount to finding these two defendants in contempt of a
court order to which they were never parties.
Although the court has power to enjoin a violation of
a covenant not to compete, the injunction can run only for
the period of time originally agreed upon. United Auto
Supply Co., Inc. v. Amaro, 346 Mass. 625 (1964). In the
instant case, the period of restraint in the original consent decree was to expire on September 30, 1974. The injunction against 0. S. I. from hiring or accepting the orders
fTom the individuals named in that consent decree until
J m u a r y 1, 1976, goes beyond the terms of that consent
decree.
IV,

AN EXPERT WITNESS, RICHARD LEAVITT, APPOINTED BY

THE COUHT AS AN "IMPARTIAL EXAMINER," C/0ULD NOT
PROVIDE BY HEARSAY, THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE GROSS
SALES OF C. S. I.

The court appointed, over objection, Richard Leavitt as
an "independent examiner, in the nature of a master or
auditor" (Tr. I 245). The purpose of the appointment
was to prepare a summary of information from certain
books and records provided by the defendants. The testimony of this witness was based solely upon the information he received from the records so provided (Tr. I I 453). This witness, admittedly an expert in the field of
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accounting, testified to opinions and calculations based exclusively upon hearsay. Because the only basis of his testimony was hearsay, his testimony and his calculations
(Ex. 17, Tr. II 39) should have been excluded. Stale Tax
Commission v. Assessors of Springfield, 331 Mass. 677
(1954).
V.

THE DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION LEVIED AGAINST EDWARD
J. LEYDEN FOB CONTEMPT OF COUKT WERE EXCESSIVE AND
UNREASONABLE.

In the case of Edward J. Leyden, the court assessed
$5,784.26 as compensatory damages to the plaintiff for an
admitted civil contempt (A. 78). The court, in assessing
the damages, used the amount of the total commissions
received by Leyden from 0. S. I. during the period of violation. Commissions payable to a salesman were calculated at 25 per cent of the gross sales produced. The net
operating profit lost by the plaintiff, had it proved that
it would have received those sales but for the violation
of Leyden, would have been approximately 10 per cent of
the gross sales. Accordingly, the court has assessed punitive damages against the defendant Leyden in an amount
equal to 15 per cent of the gross sales he produced, or in
excess of $3,524.26. Although the amount of compensatory damages levied upon one who has "Usobeyed a decree
need not be measured with undue precision, the fine is
measured in some degree by the pecuniary injury caused
by the disobedience. Department of Public Health v. Cumberland Cattle Company, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1972) 1031.
There was no evidence to support the conclusion that the
plaintiff sustained any loss of profits as a result of the
defendant Leyden's violation.
The court allowed additional remedial relief against
Leyden by enjoining him from selling plastic telephone
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book covers until January 1, 1976 (A. 78). The violation of
the consent decree occurred from February, 1974, through
approximately June, 1974. It would be more reasonable
to enjoin Lej'den for the same number of days as his violation continued. To extend an injunction for a period of
time almost equal to, but in addition to, the original injunction contained in the consent decree was unreasonable and poses an economic hardship upon the defendant.
Conclusion*
For the reasons stated in this brief, it is respectfully
submitted that the judgment of the trial court against the
defendants C. S. I. and Schrom should be reversed and
that the damages and injunction levied against the defendant Leyden should be modified.
Eespectfully submitted,
SAVINO J. BASTLE,
SANTANIELLO, POSNIK & BASILE,
95 State Street,
Springfield, Massachusetts 01103.
(413) 781-2130
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Ryan Mantz
From:

Ryan Mantz {rmantz@scottsutah.com]

Sent:

Monday, March 06, 20064:10 PM

To:

'jrbabilisfSjaol.com'; Kevin Brtton (kbrtton@scottsutah.com); Steve Fisher

Cc:

,

Subject:

LESS Direct Mail - MORE Sales

{stevefisher7$@hotmail .com)
rrnantz@scottsutah.corrf

Importance: High

Here Is a summary of how the year is going in Safes thus far.
Attached is a fife illustrating by branch performance and more detail of what Is discussed below.

Our Call Ahead % carrying ovqr from last year was 50% in Utah, Thh> means 14 of our business was In
jeopardy on every round of phone calls.
• Salt Lake & Ogden had high cancel rates last year and this was no doubt a big factor
o Salt Lake had a 53% Base Cancel Rate.
• We have dropped the New Sale Call Ahead rate to only 8% over the last 6 weeks?
• This will have a profound effect on Retention in 2006.
• This feat is truly remarkable and should not be glossed over It will revolutions our business.
Based on reports from last year and this year's manual tracking of Inquiries we have substantially less
Direct Mail Responses.
• Reports show we have received 3 J83 less Inquiries year over year!
• Last year we show we received 7,097 pieces to date Vs. 3,314 this year.
• This is a 53% Drop in Mail Response.
• This has the potential to be devastating to our business.
This is an alarming number no doubt. This could mean one or a combination of several different things:
• We counted our leads incorrectly last year and didn't receive as many as we thought.
o For the 1 d bullet to be true, we would have to discount to stories about going to the post office and
picking up boxes of leads last year.
* Weather has impacted our customer's desire to respond.
• Mail simply did not reach our customers
• We have already sold to the people that respond in January & February
o As a result fewer people may respond this tie around.
• People are bored with our Mail Piece and it is time for a change,
• Real Green tracked them wrong and they never existed to the level we thought to begin with.
Sales
o
o
o
o

Growth has occurred despite the dramatic drop in Mail Response,
As a region we have increased sales revenue 46% over fast year.
Last year we had sold $617,000
This year we have sold $899,950
While Inquiries dropped 53% - sales rose 46% - This is a 99% swing in improvement*
o Our sales team has improved immensely over last year. We could be going backwards as a
business or simply staying flat with 3,700 tess Inquiries.
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o Take time to pat our Sales Managers on the back. They are really saving our bacon by teaching
these guys how to maximize e^fe^y lead.
Sales Dollars per Inquiry... This means dividing the Total Revenue Sold by the Total Inquiries Received,
o Last year we averaged $87 in sales for every Inquiry Received.
o in other words a lot of people said *no" or did not take all of our services when they said "yes."
o This year we are averaging $271 per Inquiry Received.
o This should not be confused with Average Value per Customer,
o This is a 200% improvement
o We have been able to sell more than last year as a result of the following:
1. 14% improvement on Average Application Price
2. 22% of our new sales have an ICS
• 3, Higher Apps Per Sate
4. Tree & Shrub Sales
5. 90% Grub to Sale Ratios (Almost all of our sales have grubs)
Percent to Year End Sales Revenue... We are already half way to our Year End Sales Revenue number last
year!
o In 2005 we sold $1,884,152
According to the Sales Report 1/01/05 to 12/31/05
o So far we have sold $899,950
o This is 43% of what we did for the entire year last year and we have just begun
March.
o Last year at this time we were at 33% of our year end number.
IN SUMMARY: .
While we should be very concerned about our current mail numbers, we are dominating last year's results. If we
sofd this years low Inquiries at last year's efficiencies, we would have sold only $288,000. Instead of dwelling on
crappy response rates, we are getting it done as a team.
I want to make sure everyone is aware of the success we are having and warn us against just talking about our
dire response rates compared to last year. Thank our reps and sales managers for not turning in a $228,000 and
getting us to the near $900 O00 mark through February!
DONT FORGET: Attached is afileillustrating by branch performance and more detail of what is discussed
below.
Thanks for reading this far!
Ryan Mantz
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Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party)
House of Lords
[2001] 1 AC 268
JUDGMENTS:
LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD: . My Lords, George Blake is a notorious, self-confessed
traitor. He was employed as a member of the security and intelligence services for 17 years, from 1944
to 1961. In 1951 he became an agent for the Soviet Union. From then until 1960 he disclosed valuable
secret information and documents gained through his employment. On 3 May 1961 he pleaded guilty to
five charges of unlawfully communicating information contrary to section 1(1 )(c) of the Official Secrets
Act 1911. He was sentenced to 42 years' imprisonment. This sentence reflected the extreme gravity of
the harm brought about by his betrayal of secret information.
In 1966 Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs prison and fled to Berlin and then to Moscow. He is
still there, a fugitive from justice. In 1989 he wrote his autobiography. Certain parts of the book related
to his activities as a secret intelligence officer. By 1989 the information in the book was no longer
confidential, nor was its disclosure damaging to the public interest. On 4 May 1989 Blake entered into a
publishing contract with Jonathan Cape Ltd. He granted Jonathan Cape an exclusive right to publish the
book in this country in return for royalties. Jonathan Cape agreed to pay him advances against royalties:
oe50,000 on signing the contract, a further oe50,000 on delivery of the manuscript, and another
oe50,000 on publication. Plainly, had Blake not been an infamous spy who had also dramatically
escaped from prison, his autobiography would not have commanded payments of this order.
The book, entitled No Other Choice, was published on 17 September 1990. Neither the security and
intelligence services nor any other branch of the Government were aware of the book until its
publication was announced. Blake had not sought any prior authorisation from the Crown to disclose
any of the information in the book relating to the Secret Intelligence Service. Jonathan Cape has,
apparently, already paid Blake about oe60,000 under the publishing agreement. In practice that money is
irrecoverable. A further substantial amount, in the region of oe90,000, remains payable. These
proceedings concern this unpaid money.
The proceedings
On 24 May 1991 the Attorney General commenced an action against Blake, with a view to ensuring he
should not enjoy any further financial fruits from his treachery. The writ and statement of claim sought
relief on a variety of grounds. The trial took place before Sir Richard Scott V-C. Blake was not
represented at the trial. He had sought unsuccessfully to have access to the further money due and owing
to him by the publisher for the purpose of funding his defence. He was refused legal aid. But the court
had the assistance of leading and junior counsel as amici curiae. At the trial the Crown rested its claim
exclusively on one cause of action: that in writing the book and authorising its publication Blake was in
breach of fiduciary duties he owed the Crown. Sir Richard Scott V-C rejected this claim and dismissed
the action [1997] Ch 84. The Vice-Chancellor accepted that former members of the intelligence and
security services owed a lifelong duty of non-disclosure in respect of secret and confidential
information. But the law did not impose a duty which went beyond this.
The Crown appealed. Blake was not represented on the hearing of the appeal but, once again, the court
had the assistance of leading and junior counsel as amici curiae. The Court of Appeal, comprising Lord
Woolf MR, Millett and Mummery LJJ, allowed the appeal [1998] Ch 439. The court upheld Sir Richard
Scott V-Cs ruling on the breach of fiduciary claim. On this appeal to your Lordships' House the
Attorney General has not sought to challenge that decision. However, the Court of Appeal permitted the
Attorney General to amend his statement of claim and advance a public law claim. In making this claim
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the Attorney General asserted, not a private law right on behalf of the Crown, but a claim for relief in his
capacity as guardian of the public interest. In this latter capacity the Attorney General may,
exceptionally, invoke the assistance of the civil law in aid of the criminal law. Typically this occurs
where an offence is frequently repeated in disregard of an inadequate penalty: see Gouriet v Union of
Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435. In the present case Blake's disclosure of the information in his
autobiography to his publishers was a breach of section 1(1) of the Official Secrets Act 1989:
"A person who is or has been ... a member of the security and intelligence services ... is guilty of an
offence if without lawful authority he discloses any information ... relating to security or intelligence
which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as a member of any of those services ..."
If Blake's disclosure occurred before this Act came into force on 1 March 1990, the disclosure was an
offence under comparable provisions in section 2(1) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The Court of
Appeal held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts, on an application of the Attorney General, was not
limited to granting an injunction restraining the commission or repeated commission of an offence. Lord
Woolf MR said [1998] Ch 439, 462:
"If, as here, a criminal offence has already been committed, the jurisdiction extends to enforcing public
policy with respect to the consequences of the commission of that crime, eg restraining receipt by the
criminal of a further benefit as a result of or in connection with that crime ... This is an exceptional case
in which the Attorney General is entitled to intervene by instituting civil proceedings, in aid of the
criminal law, to uphold the public policy of ensuring that a criminal does not retain profit directly
derived from the commission of his crime."
The court made an order in the following terms:
"That the defendant George Blake be restrained until further order from receiving or from authorising
any person to receive on his behalf any payment or other benefit resulting from or in connection with the
exploitation of No Other Choice in any form or any information therein relating to security and
intelligence which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as a member of the Secret
Intelligence Service."
Blake appealed against this decision of the Court of Appeal. On the hearing of this appeal by your
Lordships he was represented by counsel and solicitors acting pro bono. I wish to pay tribute to the
thoroughness with which counsel and solicitors prepared the appeal and the expertise with which Mr
Clayton presented it to your Lordships.
The private law claim
In the course of his judgment [1998] Ch 439, 455-459 Lord Woolf MR made some interesting
observations on a matter which had not been the subject of argument either in the Court of Appeal or
before Sir Richard Scott V-C. The point arose out of the amendments made to the statement of claim in
the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. On 16 August 1944 Blake signed an Official
Secrets Act declaration. This declaration included an undertaking:
"... I undertake not to divulge any official information gained by me as a result of my employment,
either in the press or in book form. I also understand that these provisions apply not only during the
period of service but also after employment has ceased."
This undertaking was contractually binding. Had Blake not signed it he would not have been employed.
By submitting his manuscript for publication without first obtaining clearance Blake committed a breach

of this undertaking. The Court of Appeal suggested that the Crown might have a private law claim to
"restitutionary damages for breach of contract", and invited submissions on this issue. The Attorney
General decided that the Crown did not wish to advance argument on this point in the Court of Appeal.
The Attorney General, however, wished to keep the point open for a higher court. The Court of Appeal
expressed the view, necessarily tentative in the circumstances, that the law of contract would be
seriously defective if the court were unable to award restitutionary damages for breach of contract. The
law is now sufficiently mature to recognise a restitutionary claim for profits made from a breach of
contract in appropriate situations. These include cases of "skimped" performance, and cases where the
defendant obtained his profit by doing "the very thing" he contracted not to do. The present case fell into
the latter category: Blake earned his profit by doing the very thing he had promised not to do.
This matter was pursued in your Lordships' House. Prompted by an invitation from your Lordships, the
Attorney General advanced an argument that restitutionary principles ought to operate to enable the
Crown to recover from Blake his profits arising from his breach of contract. It will be convenient to
consider this private law claim first.
This is a subject on which there is a surprising dearth of judicial decision. By way of contrast, over the
last 20 years there has been no lack of academic writing. This includes valuable comment on the Court
of Appeal dicta in thepresent case: by Janet O'Sullivan, "Reflections on the Role of Restitutionary
Damages to protect contractual expectations" (to be published), and Catherine Mitchell, "Remedial
Inadequacy in Contract and the Role of Restitutionary Damages" (1999) 15 JCL 133. Most writers have
favoured the view that in some circumstances the innocent party to a breach of contract should be able to
compel the defendant to disgorge the profits he obtained from his breach of contract. However, there is a
noticeable absence of any consensus on what are the circumstances in which this remedy should be
available. Professor Burrows has described this as a devilishly difficult topic: see "No Restitutionary
Damages for Breach of Contract" [1993] LMCLQ 453. The broad proposition that a wrongdoer should
not be allowed to profit from his wrong has an obvious attraction. The corollary is that the person
wronged may recover the amount of this profit when he has suffered no financially measurable loss. As
Glidewell LJ observed in Halifax Building Society v Thomas [1996] Ch 217, 229, the corollary is not so
obviously persuasive. In these choppy waters the common law and equity steered different courses. The
effects of this are still being felt.
Interference with rights of property
So I turn to established, basic principles. I shall first set the scene by noting how the court approaches
the question of financial recompense for interference with rights of property. As with breaches of
contract, so with tort, the general principle regarding assessment of damages is that they are
compensatory for loss or injury. The general rule is that, in the oft quoted words of Lord Blackburn, the
measure of damages is to be, as far as possible, that amount of money which will put the injured party in
the same position he would have been in had he not sustained the wrong: Livingstone v Rawyards Coal
Co(1880) 5 AppCas 25, 39. Damages are measured by the plaintiffs loss, not the defendant's gain. But
the common law, pragmatic as ever, has long recognised that there are many commonplace situations
where a strict application of this principle would not do justice between the parties. Then compensation
for the wrong done to the plaintiff is measured by a different yardstick. A trespasser who enters
another's land may cause the landowner no financial loss. In such a case damages are measured by the
benefit received by the trespasser, namely, by his use of the land. The same principle is applied where
the wrong consists of use of another's land for depositing waste, or by using a path across the land or
using passages in an underground mine. In this type of case the damages recoverable will be, in short,
the price a reasonable person would pay for the right of user: see Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo
Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538, and the "wayleave" cases such as Martin v Porter (1839) 5 M & W
351 and Jegon v Vivian (1871) LR 6 ChApp 742. A more recent example was the non-removal of a
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floating dock, in Penarth Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep 359.
The same principle is applied to the wrongful detention of goods. An instance is the much cited decision
of the Court of Appeal in Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952]
2 QB 246, concerning portable switchboards. But the principle has a distinguished ancestry. The Earl of
Halsbury LC famously asked in The Mediana [1900] AC 113, 117, that if a person took away a chair
from his room and kept it for 12 months, could anybody say you had a right to diminish the damages
by showing that I did not usually sit in that chair, or that there were plenty of other chairs in the room?
To the same effect was Lord Shaw's telling example in Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and
Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104, 119. It bears repetition:
"If A, being a liveryman, keeps his horse standing idle in the stable, and B, against his wish or without
his knowledge, rides or drives it out, it is no answer to A for B to say: 'Against what loss do you want to
be restored? I restore the horse. There is no loss. The horse is none the worse; it is the better for the
exercise.'"
Lord Shaw prefaced this observation with a statement of general principle:
"wherever an abstraction or invasion of property has occurred, then, unless such abstraction or invasion
were to be sanctioned by law, the law ought to yield a recompense under the category or principle ...
either of price or of hire."
That was a patent infringement case. The House of Lords held that damages should be assessed on the
footing of a royalty for every infringing article.
This principle is established and not controversial. More difficult is the alignment of this measure of
damages within the basic compensatory measure. Recently there has been a move towards applying the
label of restitution to awards of this character: see, for instance, Ministry of Defence v Ashman [1993] 2
EGLR 102, 105 and Ministry of Defence v Thompson [1993] 2 EGLR 107. However that may be, these
awards cannot be regarded as conforming to the strictly compensatory measure of damage for the
injured person's loss unless loss is given a strained and artificial meaning. The reality is that the injured
person's rights were invaded but, in financial terms, he suffered no loss. Nevertheless the common law
has found a means to award him a sensibly calculated amount of money. Such awards are probably best
regarded as an exception to the general rule.
Courts of equity went further than the common law courts. In some cases equity required the wrongdoer
to yield up all his gains. In respect of certain wrongs which originally or ordinarily were the subject of
proceedings in the Court of Chancery, the standard remedies were injunction and, incidental thereto, an
account of profits. These wrongs included passing off, infringement of trade marks, copyrights and
patents, and breach of confidence. Some of these subjects are now embodied in statutory codes. An
injunction restrained the continuance of the wrong, and the wrongdoer was required to account for the
profits or benefits he had obtained from breaches or infringements which had already occurred. The
court always had a discretion regarding the grant of the remedy of an account of profits, and this remains
the position. Further, the circumstances in which an account of profits is available under the statutes
vary. For instance, an account of profits may not be ordered against a defendant in a patent infringement
action who proves that at the date of the infringement he was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds
for supposing, that the patent existed: Patents Act 1977, section 62(1).
In these cases the courts of equity appear to have regarded an injunction and account of profits as more
appropriate remedies than damages because of the difficulty of assessing the extent of the loss. Thus, in
1803 Lord Eldon LC stated, in Hogg v Kirby, 8 Ves 215, 223, a passing off case:

"what is the consequence in law and in equity? ... a court of equity in these cases is not content with an
action for damages; for it is nearly impossible to know the extent of the damage; and therefore the
remedy here, though not compensating the pecuniary damage except by an account of profits, is the best:
the remedy by an injunction and account."
Whether this justification for ordering an account of profits holds good factually in every case must be
doubtful. Be that as it may, in these types of case equity considered that the appropriate response to the
violation of the plaintiffs right was that the defendant should surrender all his gains, and that he should
do so irrespective of whether the violation had caused the plaintiff any financially measurable loss.
Gains were to be disgorged even though they could not be shown to correspond with any disadvantage
suffered by the other party. This lack of correspondence was openly acknowledged. In Lever v Goodwin
(1887) 36 ChD 1, 7, Cotton LJ stated it was "well known" that in trade mark and patent cases the
plaintiff was entitled, if he succeeded in getting an injunction, to take either of two forms of relief: he
might claim from the defendant either the damage he had sustained from the defendant's wrongful act or
the profit made by the defendant from the defendant's wrongful act.
Considered as a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why equity required the wrongdoer to account
for all his profits in these cases, whereas the common law's response was to require a wrongdoer merely
to pay a reasonable fee for use of another's land or goods. In all these cases rights of property were
infringed. This difference in remedial response appears to have arisen simply as an accident of history.
In some instances the common law itself afforded a wronged party a choice of remedies. A notable
example is the wrong of conversion. A person whose goods were wrongfully converted by another had a
choice of two remedies against the wrongdoer. He could recover damages, in respect of the loss he had
sustained by the conversion. Or he could recover the proceeds of the conversion obtained by the
defendant: see United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1, 34, per Lord Romer.
Historically, the latter alternative was achieved by recourse to an element of legal fiction, whereby the
innocent party "waived the tort". The innocent party could suppose that the wrongful sale had been
made with his consent and bring an action for money "had and received to his use": see Lamine v
Dorrell (1705) 2 Ld Raym 1216, 1217. Holt CJ observed that these actions had "crept in by degrees".
Breach of trust and fiduciary duty
I should refer briefly to breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty. Equity reinforces the duty of
fidelity owed by a trustee or fiduciary by requiring him to account for any profits he derives from his
office or position. This ensures that trustees and fiduciaries are financially disinterested in carrying out
their duties. They may not put themselves in a position where their duty and interest conflict. To this end
they must not make any unauthorised profit. If they do, they are accountable. Whether the beneficiaries
or persons to whom the fiduciary duty is owed suffered any loss by the impugned transaction is
altogether irrelevant. The accountability of the army sergeant in Reading v Attorney General [1951] AC
507 is a familiar application of this principle to a servant of the Crown.
Damages under Lord Cairns's Act
I must also mention the jurisdiction to award damages under section 2 of the Chancery Amendment Act
1858 (21 & 22 Vict c 27), commonly known as Lord Cairns's Act. This Act has been repealed but the
jurisdiction remains. Section 2 empowered the Court of Chancery at its discretion, in all cases where it
had jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunction or specific performance, to award damages
in addition to or in substitution for an injunction or specific performance. Thus section 2 enabled the
Court of Chancery, sitting at Lincoln's Inn, to award damages when declining to grant equitable relief
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rather than, as had been the practice since Lord Eldon's decision in Todd v Gee (1810) 17 Ves 273,
sending suitors across London to the common law courts at Westminster Hall.
Lord Cairns's Act had a further effect. The common law courts' jurisdiction to award damages was
confined to loss or injury flowing from a cause of action which had accrued before the writ was issued.
Thus in the case of a continuing wrong, such as maintaining overhanging eaves and gutters, damages
were limited to the loss suffered up to the commencement of the action: see Battishill v Reed(1856) 18
CB 696. Lord Cairns's Act liberated the courts from this fetter. In future, if the court declined to grant an
injunction, which had the effect in practice of sanctioning the indefinite continuance of a wrong, the
court could assess damages to include losses likely to follow from the anticipated future continuance of
the wrong as well as losses already suffered. The power to give damages in lieu of an injunction
imported the power to give an equivalent for what was lost by the refusal of an injunction: see Leeds
Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851, 859, per Viscount Finlay. It is important to
note, however, that although the Act had the effect of enabling the court in this regard to award damages
in respect of the future as well as the past, the Act did not alter the measure to be employed in assessing
damages: see Johnson v Agnew[1980] AC 367, 400, per Lord Wilberforce. Thus, in the same way as
damages at common law for violations of a property right may by measured by reference to the benefits
wrongfully obtained by a defendant, so under Lord Cairns' Act damages may include damages measured
by reference to the benefits likely to be obtained in future by the defendant. This approach has been
adopted on many occasions. Recent examples are Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408 and Jaggard v
Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269, both cases concerned with access to a newly-built house over another's land.
The measure of damages awarded in this type of case is often analysed as damages for loss of a
bargaining opportunity or, which comes to the same, the price payable for the compulsory acquisition of
a right. This analysis is correct. The court's refusal to grant an injunction means that in practice the
defendant is thereby permitted to perpetuate the wrongful state of affairs he has brought about. But this
analysis takes the matter now under discussion no further forward. A property right has value to the
extent only that the court will enforce it or award damages for its infringement. The question under
discussion is whether the court will award substantial damages for an infringement when no financial
loss flows from the infringement and, moreover, in a suitable case will assess the damages by reference
to the defendant's profit obtained from the infringement. The cases mentioned above show that the
courts habitually do that very thing.
Breach of contract
Against this background I turn to consider the remedies available for breaches of contract. The basic
remedy is an award of damages. In the much quoted words of Baron Parke, the rule of the common law
is that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to
be placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed: Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch
850, 855. Leaving aside the anomalous exception of punitive damages, damages are compensatory. That
is axiomatic. It is equally well established that an award of damages, assessed by reference to financial
loss, is not always "adequate" as a remedy for a breach of contract. The law recognises that a party to a
contract may have an interest in performance which is not readily measurable in terms of money. On
breach the innocent party suffers a loss. He fails to obtain the benefit promised by the other party to the
contract. To him the loss may be as important as financially measurable loss, or more so. An award of
damages, assessed by reference to financial loss, will not recompense him properly. For him a
financially assessed measure of damages is inadequate.
The classic example of this type of case, as every law student knows, is a contract for the sale of land.
The buyer of a house may be attracted by features which have little or no impact on the value of the
house. An award of damages, based on strictly financial criteria, would fail to recompense a

disappointed buyer for this head of loss. The primary response of the law to this type of case is to
ensure, if possible, that the contract is performed in accordance with its terms. The court may make
orders compelling the party who has committed a breach of contract, or is threatening to do so, to carry
out his contractual obligations. To this end the court has wide powers to grant injunctive relief. The
court will, for instance, readily make orders for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of land,
and sometimes it will do so in respect of contracts for the sale of goods. In Beswick v Beswick [1968]
AC 58 the court made an order for the specific performance of a contract to make payments of money to
a third party. The law recognised that the innocent party to the breach of contract had a legitimate
interest in having the contract performed even though he himself would suffer no financial loss from its
breach. Likewise, the court will compel the observance of negative obligations by granting injunctions.
This may include a mandatory order to undo an existing breach, as where the court orders the defendant
to pull down building works carried out in breach of covenant.
All this is trite law. In practice, these specific remedies go a long way towards providing suitable
protection for innocent parties who will suffer loss from breaches of contract which are not adequately
remediable by an award of damages. But these remedies are not always available. For instance,
confidential information may be published in breach of a non-disclosure agreement before the innocent
party has time to apply to the court for urgent relief. Then the breach is irreversible. Further, these
specific remedies are discretionary. Contractual obligations vary infinitely. So do the circumstances in
which breaches occur, and the circumstances in which remedies are sought. The court may, for instance,
decline to grant specific relief on the ground that this would be oppressive.
An instance of this nature occurred in Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1
WLR 798. For social and economic reasons the court refused to make a mandatory order for the
demolition of housesbuilt on land burdened with a restrictive covenant. Instead, Brightman J made an
award of damages under the jurisdiction which originated with Lord Cairns's Act. The existence of the
new houses did not diminish the value of the benefited land by one farthing. The judge considered that if
the plaintiffs were given a nominal sum, or no sum, justice would manifestly not have been done. He
assessed the damages at 5% of the developer's anticipated profit, this being the amount of money which
could reasonably have been demanded for a relaxation of the covenant.
In reaching his conclusion the judge applied by analogy the cases mentioned above concerning the
assessment of damages when a defendant has invaded another's property rights but without diminishing
the value of the property. I consider he was right to do so. Property rights are superior to contractual
rights in that, unlike contractual rights, property rights may survive against an indefinite class of
persons. However, it is not easy to see why, as between the parties to a contract, a violation of a party's
contractual rights should attract a lesser degree of remedy than a violation of his property rights. As
Lionel D Smith has pointed out in his article "Disgorgement of the profits of Breach of Contract:
Property, Contract and 'Efficient Breach'" (1995) 24 Can BLJ 121, it is not clear why it should be any
more permissible to expropriate personal rights than it is permissible to expropriate property rights.
I turn to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1
WLR 1361. A local authority had sold surplus land to a developer and obtained a covenant that the
developer would develop the land in accordance with an existing planning permission. The sole purpose
of the local authority in imposing the covenant was to enable it to share in the planning gain if, as
happened, planning permission was subsequently granted for the erection of a larger number of houses.
The purpose was that the developer would have to apply and pay for a relaxation of the covenant if it
wanted to build more houses. In breach of covenant the developer completed the development in
accordance with the later planning permission, and the local authority brought a claim for damages. The
erection of the larger number of houses had not caused any financial loss to the local authority. The
judge awarded nominal damages of oe2, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the local authority's appeal.
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This is a difficult decision. It has attracted criticism from academic commentators and also in judgments
of Sir Thomas Bingham MR and Millett LJ in Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269.1 need not pursue
the detailed criticisms. In the Bredero case Dillon LJ himself noted, at p 1364, that had the covenant
been worded differently, there could have been provision for payment of an increased price if a further
planning permission were forthcoming. That would have been enforceable. But, according to the
Brederodecision, a covenant not to erect any further houses without permission, intended to achieve the
same result, may be breached with impunity. That would be a sorry reflection on the law. Suffice to say,
in so far as the Bredero decision is inconsistent with the approach adopted in the Wrotham Park case, the
latter approach is to be preferred.
The Wrotham Park case, therefore, still shines, rather as a solitary beacon, showing that in contract as
well as tort damages are not always narrowly confined to recoupment of financial loss. In a suitable case
damages for breach of contract may be measured by the benefit gained by thewrongdoer from the
breach. The defendant must make a reasonable payment in respect of the benefit he has gained. In the
present case the Crown seeks to go further. The claim is for all the profits of Blake's book which the
publisher has not yet paid him. This raises the question whether an account of profits can ever be given
as a remedy for breach of contract. The researches of counsel have been unable to discover any case
where the court has made such an order on a claim for breach of contract. In Tito v Waddell (No 2)
[1977] Ch 106, 332, a decision which has proved controversial, Sir Robert Megarry V-C said that, as a
matter of fundamental principle, the question of damages was "not one of making the defendant
disgorge" his gains, in that case what he had saved by committing the wrong, but "one of compensating
the plaintiff. In Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti [1976] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 293, 337, Kerr J summarily rejected a claim for an account of profits when ship owners withdrew
ships on a rising market.
There is a light sprinkling of cases where courts have made orders having the same effect as an order for
an account of profits, but the courts seem always to have attached a different label. A person who, in
breach of contract, sells land twice over must surrender his profits on the second sale to the original
buyer. Since courts regularly make orders for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of land, a
seller of land is, to an extent, regarded as holding the land on trust for the buyer: Lake v Bayliss [1974] 1
WLR 1073. In Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American Telegraph Co Ltd[1912] AC 555 a railway
company agreed not to transmit any commercial messages over a particular telegraph wire except for the
benefit and account of the telegraph company. The Privy Council held that the railway company was
liable to account as a trustee for the profits it wrongfully made from its use of the wire for commercial
purposes. In British Motor Trade Association v Gilbert [1951] 2 All ER 641 the plaintiff suffered no
financial loss but the award of damages for breach of contract effectively stripped the wrongdoer of the
profit he had made from his wrongful venture into the black market for new cars.
These cases illustrate that circumstances do arise when the just response to a breach of contract is that
the wrongdoer should not be permitted to retain any profit from the breach. In these cases the courts
have reached the desired result by straining existing concepts. Professor Peter Birks has deplored the
"failure of jurisprudence when the law is forced into this kind of abusive instrumentalism"; see "Profits
of Breach of Contract" (1993) 109 LQR 518, 520. Some years ago Professor Dawson suggested there is
no inherent reason why the technique of equity courts in land contracts should not be more widely
employed, not by granting remedies as the by-product of a phantom "trust" created by the contract, but
as an alternative form of money judgment remedy. That well known ailment of lawyers, a hardening of
the categories, ought not to be an obstacle: see "Restitution or Damages" (1959) 20 Ohio SLJ 175.
My conclusion is that there seems to be no reason, in principle, why the court must in all circumstances
rule out an account of profits as a remedy for breach of contract. I prefer to avoid the unhappy

expression "restitutionary damages". Remedies are the law's response to a wrong (or, more precisely, to
a cause of action). When, exceptionally, a just response to a breach of contract so requires, the court
should be able to grant the discretionaryremedy of requiring a defendant to account to the plaintiff for
the benefits he has received from his breach of contract. In the same way as a plaintiffs interest in
performance of a contract may render it just and equitable for the court to make an order for specific
performance or grant an injunction, so the plaintiffs interest in performance may make it just and
equitable that the defendant should retain no benefit from his breach of contract.
The state of the authorities encourages me to reach this conclusion, rather than the reverse. The law
recognises that damages are not always a sufficient remedy for breach of contract. This is the foundation
of the court's jurisdiction to grant the remedies of specific performance and injunction. Even when
awarding damages, the law does not adhere slavishly to the concept of compensation for financially
measurable loss. When the circumstances require, damages are measured by reference to the benefit
obtained by the wrongdoer. This applies to interference with property rights. Recently, the like approach
has been adopted to breach of contract. Further, in certain circumstances an account of profits is ordered
in preference to an award of damages. Sometimes the injured party is given the choice: either
compensatory damages or an account of the wrongdoer's profits. Breach of confidence is an instance of
this. If confidential information is wrongfully divulged in breach of a non-disclosure agreement, it
would be nothing short of sophistry to say that an account of profits may be ordered in respect of the
equitable wrong but not in respect of the breach of contract which governs the relationship between the
parties. With the established authorities going thus far, I consider it would be only a modest step for the
law to recognise openly that, exceptionally, an account of profits may be the most appropriate remedy
for breach of contract. It is not as though this step would contradict some recognised principle applied
consistently throughout the law to the grant or withholding of the remedy of an account of profits. No
such principle is discernible.
The main argument against the availability of an account of profits as a remedy for breach of contract is
that the circumstances where this remedy may be granted will be uncertain. This will have an unsettling
effect on commercial contracts where certainty is important. I do not think these fears are well founded.
I see no reason why, in practice, the availability of the remedy of an account of profits need disturb
settled expectations in the commercial or consumer world. An account of profits will be appropriate only
in exceptional circumstances. Normally the remedies of damages, specific performance and injunction,
coupled with the characterisation of some contractual obligations as fiduciary, will provide an adequate
response to a breach of contract. It will be only in exceptional cases, where those remedies are
inadequate, that any question of accounting for profits will arise. No fixed rules can be prescribed. The
court will have regard to all the circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract, the purpose
of the contractual provision which has been breached, the circumstances in which the breach occurred,
the consequences of the breach and the circumstances in which relief is being sought. A useful general
guide, although not exhaustive, is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the
defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit.
It would be difficult, and unwise, to attempt to be more specific. In the Court of Appeal [1998] Ch 439
Lord Woolf MR suggested there are at leasttwo situations in which justice requires the award of
restitutionary damages where compensatory damages would be inadequate: see p 458. Lord Woolf MR
was not there addressing the question of when an account of profits, in the conventional sense, should be
available. But I should add that, so far as an account of profits is concerned, the suggested categorisation
would not assist. The first suggested category was the case of "skimped" performance, where the
defendant fails to provide the full extent of services he has contracted to provide. He should be liable to
pay back the amount of expenditure he saved by the breach. This is a much discussed problem. But a
part refund of the price agreed for services would not fall within the scope of an account of profits as
ordinarily understood. Nor does an account of profits seem to be needed in this context. The resolution
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of the problem of cases of skimped performance, where the plaintiff does not get what was agreed, may
best be found elsewhere. If a shopkeeper supplies inferior and cheaper goods than those ordered and
paid for, he has to refund the difference in price. That would be the outcome of a claim for damages for
breach of contract. That would be so, irrespective of whether the goods in fact served the intended
purpose. There must be scope for a similar approach, without any straining of principle, in cases where
the defendant provided inferior and cheaper services than those contracted for.
The second suggested category was where the defendant has obtained his profit by doing the very thing
he contracted not to do. This category is defined too widely to assist. The category is apt to embrace all
express negative obligations. But something more is required than mere breach of such an obligation
before an account of profits will be the appropriate remedy.
Lord Woolf MR [1998] Ch 439, 457, 458, also suggested three facts which should not be a sufficient
ground for departing from the normal basis on which damages are awarded: the fact that the breach was
cynical and deliberate; the fact that the breach enabled the defendant to enter into a more profitable
contract elsewhere; and the fact that by entering into a new and more profitable contract the defendant
put it out of his power to perform his contract with the plaintiff. I agree that none of these facts would
be, by itself, a good reason for ordering an account of profits.
The present case
The present case is exceptional. The context is employment as a member of the security and intelligence
services. Secret information is the lifeblood of these services. In the 1950s Blake deliberately committed
repeated breaches of his undertaking not to divulge official information gained as a result of his
employment. He caused untold and immeasurable damage to the public interest he had committed
himself to serve. In 1990 he published his autobiography, a further breach of his express undertaking.
By this time the information disclosed was no longer confidential. In the ordinary course of commercial
dealings the disclosure of non-confidential information might be regarded as venial. In the present case
disclosure was also a criminal offence under the Official Secrets Acts, even though the information was
no longer confidential. Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989 draws a distinction in this regard
between members of the security and intelligence services and other Crown servants. Under section 1(3)
a person who is or has been a Crown servant is guilty of an offence if without lawful authorityhe makes
"a damaging disclosure" of information relating to security or intelligence. The offence is drawn more
widely in the case of a present or past member of the security and intelligence services. Such a person is
guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he discloses "any information" relating to security or
intelligence which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as a member of those
services. This distinction was approved in Parliament after debate when the legislation was being
enacted.
Mr Clayton submitted that section 1(1) is drawn too widely and infringes article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd 8969). Section
1(1) criminalises disclosure of information when no damage results. It focuses on the status of the
individual who makes the disclosure, rather than on the nature of the information itself. A non-damaging
disclosure by a member of the security and intelligence services is criminal, but the identical nondamaging disclosure by a Crown servant is not.
This argument was raised for the first time in this House. Your Lordships are not equipped with the
material necessary to decide the point. In the event this does not matter, because there is in the present
case another consideration which is sufficient for the purposes of the Attorney General. When he joined
the Secret Intelligence Service Blake expressly agreed in writing that he would not disclose official
information, during or after his service, in book form or otherwise. He was employed on that basis. That

was the basis on which he acquired official information. The Crown had and has a legitimate interest in
preventing Blake profiting from the disclosure of official information, whether classified or not, while a
member of the service and thereafter. Neither he, nor any other member of the service, should have a
financial incentive to break his undertaking. It is of paramount importance that members of the service
should have complete confidence in all their dealings with each other, and that those recruited as
informers should have the like confidence. Undermining the willingness of prospective informers to cooperate with the services, or undermining the morale and trust between members of the services when
engaged on secret and dangerous operations, would jeopardise the effectiveness of the service. An
absolute rule against disclosure, visible to all, makes good sense.
In considering what would be a just response to a breach of Blake's undertaking the court has to take
these considerations into account. The undertaking, if not a fiduciary obligation, was closely akin to a
fiduciary obligation, where an account of profits is a standard remedy in the event of breach. Had the
information which Blake has now disclosed still been confidential, an account of profits would have
been ordered, almost as a matter of course. In the special circumstances of the intelligence services, the
same conclusion should follow even though the information is no longer confidential. That would be a
just response to the breach. I am reinforced in this view by noting that most of the profits from the book
derive indirectly from the extremely serious and damaging breaches of the same undertaking committed
by Blake in the 1950s. As already mentioned, but for his notoriety as an infamous spy his autobiography
would not have commanded royalties of the magnitude Jonathan Cape agreed to pay.
As a footnote I observe that a similar conclusion, requiring the contract breaker to disgorge his profits,
was reached in the majority decision of the United States Supreme Court in Snepp v United States
(1980) 444 US 507.The facts were strikingly similar. A former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency, whose conditions of employment included a promise not to divulge any information relating to
the agency without prepublication clearance, published a book about the agency's activities in Vietnam.
None of the information was classified, but an agent's violation of his non-disclosure obligation
impaired the agency's ability to function properly. The court considered and rejected various forms of
relief. The actual damage was not quantifiable, nominal damages were a hollow alternative, and punitive
damages after a jury trial would be speculative and unusual. Even if recovered they would bear no
relation to either the government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. The court considered that a
remedy which required Snepp "to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness", was swift and sure, tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk and, since the remedy reached only funds
attributable to the breach, it could not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all
proportion to his gain. In order to achieve this result the court "imposed" a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits. In this country, affording the plaintiff the remedy of an account of profits is a different means to
the same end.
The form of the order
The Attorney General's entitlement to an account of Blake's profits does not, in this case, confer on the
Crown any proprietary interest in the debt due to Blake from Jonathan Cape. The Crown is entitled, on
the taking of the account, to a money judgment which can then be enforced by attachment of the debt in
the usual way. These formal steps may be capable of being short-circuited. Despite the niceties and
formalities once associated with taking an account, the amount payable under an account of profits need
not be any more elaborately or precisely calculated than damages. But in this case there is a
complication. Blake has brought third party proceedings against Jonathan Cape, seeking payment of
oe90,000 (less tax). In the third party proceedings Jonathan Cape has sought to deduct legal expenses
incurred in resisting a defamation claim and in resisting the Crown's claim. Accordingly, the appropriate
form of order on this appeal is a declaration that the Attorney General is entitled to be paid a sum equal
to whatever amount is due and owing to Blake from Jonathan Cape under the publishing agreement of 4
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May 1989. The injunction granted by the Court of Appeal will remain in force until Jonathan Cape duly
makes payment to the Attorney General. I would dismiss this appeal.
The public law claim
The public law claim, advanced by the Attorney General as guardian of the public interest, arises only if
the Crown as Blake's former employer has no private law claim in respect of the royalties. Accordingly,
having regard to the conclusion already reached on the private law claim, the public law claim does not
call for decision. However, it is right that I should state briefly why I cannot agree with the decision of
the Court of Appeal on this point, much as I sympathise with the court's objective. The public law claim
is founded on the premise that the royalties belong to Blake. The order made by the Court of Appeal was
not intended to be confiscatory. It was not intended to extinguish Blake's title. The Solicitor General
stated explicitlythat the order was intended only to be preservative: a "freezing" order. Indeed, the order
is so drafted. Blake is merely restrained from receiving payment of the royalties "until further order".
This is the classic form of order that seeks to preserve property pending the happening of some other
event. Typically, the event is a decision by the court on who is entitled to the property. Lord Woolf MR
said that the injunction in the present case would serve the ordinary purpose of preserving assets
pending adjudication.
This form of order prompts the question: in the absence of a private law claim, what is the event pending
which the money held by Jonathan Cape is being frozen in its hands? What is the anticipated
adjudication? If Blake were to return to this country he could be prosecuted for a breach of section 1(1)
of the Official Secrets Act 1989. When criminal proceedings were launched, the court would have
statutory jurisdiction to make a restraint order to prevent the proceeds of a criminal offence being used
or dissipated. If convicted, the Crown could seek a confiscation order under Part VI of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988, as amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995. But none of this is a realistic
possibility. The Solicitor General openly accepted that this is so. There is no prospect of Blake returning
to this country. Thus, the money is not being preserved pending a criminal prosecution.
This being the case, one must look elsewhere for the event which will decide what is to happen to the
money thus frozen in Jonathan Cape's hands. I have to say that one seeks in vain for any satisfactory
explanation of what that event will be. The Crown suggested that at some stage in the future an
application might be made to the court for the money to be released to a charity, or used in some other
way which would not benefit Blake. The Court of Appeal envisaged the possibility of some use for the
unpaid royalties which would not be "contrary to the public interest". But these suggestions serve only
to underline that, although not so expressed, the effect of this order is confiscatory. The order will have
the effect of preventing the money being paid to Blake. It is not envisaged that the money will ever be
paid to him. He is being deprived of the use of the money indefinitely. That is the intention. Although
the order is strictly only interlocutory in character ("until further order"), the basis on which the court
has made the order is that Blake will never receive any of the unpaid royalties. That is confiscation in
substance, if not in form. In my view the court has no power to make such an order. In respect of the
proceeds of crime Parliament has conferred upon the court power to make confiscation orders and
ancillary restraint orders. In Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, since amended by the Proceeds of
Crime Act 1995, Parliament has carefully marked out when these orders may be made. The common law
has no power to remedy any perceived deficiencies in this statutory code. An attempt to do so would .
offend the established general principle, of high constitutional importance, that there is no common law
power to take or confiscate property without compensation: see Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal
Hotel, Ltd[1920] AC 508, Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate[1965] AC 75 and, in this context,
Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr [1980] QB 49, 61-63, per Stephenson LJ.
I should add that in his judgment Lord Woolf MR [1998] Ch 439, 463, referred to several cases where

interlocutory injunctions were granted to chief constables freezing the suspected proceeds of crime in
circumstances where there had not yet been a conviction for a criminal offence. In this House Mr
Clayton mounted a sustained attack on these decisions. For his part the Solicitor General did not seek to
rely on these decisions in support of the Attorney General's case. As Lord Woolf MR noted, the
Attorney General stands in an altogether different legal and constitutional position. Since the House has
not heard contrary argument, it would not be right to express any views on Mr Clayton's submissions
regarding these cases.
JUDGMENTBY-2: LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY
JUDGMENT-2:
LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY: . My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech
prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it and for the
reasons which he has given I would dismiss this appeal.
JUDGMENTBY-3: LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
JUDGMENT-3:
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON: . My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech
prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it and for the
reasons which he gives I would dismiss this appeal but vary the order of the Court of Appeal to declare
that the Attorney General is entitled to be paid a sum equal to whatever amount is due and owing to
Blake from Jonathan Cape under the publishing agreement of 4 May 1989.
JUDGMENTBY-4: LORD STEYN
JUDGMENT-4:
LORD STEYN: . My Lords, in law classification is important. Asking the right questions in the right
order reduces the risk of wrong decisions. This truth is illustrated by the case before the House. Blake is
a convicted traitor. From 1944 to 1961 he was a member of the intelligence services. In 1944 he was
required to and did sign a contractual undertaking "not to divulge any official information gained by me
as a result of my employment, either in the press or book form". This undertaking still binds Blake. In
flagrant breach of the terms of the undertaking Blake published a book in September 1990 dealing in
part with his period in the intelligence services. This appeal concerns a sum of about oe90,000 payable
by Jonathan Cape Ltd, the publishers, to Blake. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Sir Richard
Scott V-C, that Blake is not liable to account for his profits as a fiduciary: Attorney General v Blake
[1998] Ch 439. Despite the encouragement of the Court of Appeal Mr John Smith QC, the Attorney
General at that time, declined to pursue a claim for restitutionary damages for breach of contract. While
recording its view that such a claim, if made, might be sound, the Court of Appeal was powerless to act
on that view: at pp 456-458. In a case crying out for effective relief against Blake, the Court of Appeal
devised an injunction, the objective of which was to prevent the money reaching Blake. Due to an
initiative taken by the House, the issue of the availability of a restitutionary remedy is now before the
House. At the hearing of the appeal counsel for Blake addressed first the public law question whether
the Court of Appeal had the power to grant the injunction before he dealt with the question whether a
restitutionary remedy is available. My Lords, taxonomy requires that the question whether there is such
a private law remedy should be considered first. This is so because the Court of Appeal in granting the
injunction undoubtedly extended the reach of existing powers of the Attorney General. And that course
could only sensibly be entertained if there was not a restitutionary law remedy. It is therefore to the
private law position that I first turn.
In the Court of Appeal in Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 13611 discussed
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some of the difficulties inherent in creating a general remedy for the recovery of restitutionary damages
for breach of contract. On that occasion I remarked that it is not traditional to describe a claim for
restitution following a breach of contract as damages. The terminology is however less important than
the substance: under consideration are claims for the disgorgement of profits against a contract breaker.
There has been a substantial academic debate on the merits of the actual decision in the Bredero case.
Since this issue has not been directly debated in the present case I propose to express no view on it. But
it is right to acknowledge that the academic comment has been critical of the decision in the Bredero
case I would, however, respectfully offer a comment on the valuable academic debate. On the one hand,
there is no or virtually no support for a general action for disgorgement of profits made by a contract
breaker by reason of his breach. On the other hand, there is significantly absent from the post-Bredero
academic comment a reasoned statement of the particular circumstances when such a remedy should be
available. That is not surprising because it is a notoriously a difficult subject. But the Court of Appeal
has been bold. It is said that the remedy should be available in two situations, viz (1) in cases of
"skimped" performance (where the "gain" would take the form of expense saved) and (2) "where the
defendant has obtained his profit by doing the very thing which he contracted not to do". The second
would cover the present case. But it potentially has wide application. Sir Guenter Treitel QC in The Law
of Contract, 10th ed (1999), pp 868-869, has questioned the soundness of the observations of the Court
of Appeal: see also the valuable comment by Janet O'Sullivan, "Reflections on the role of restitutionary
damages to protect contractual expectations" (to be published) and Hanoch Dagan, "Restitutionary
Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory" [2000] 1 Theoretical Inquiries in
Law 115.1 am not at present willing to endorse the broad observations of the Court of Appeal.
Exceptions to the general principle that there is no remedy for disgorgement of profits against a contract
breaker are best hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases.
In the hearing before the House Mr Ross Cranston, the Solicitor General, in a thoughtful and careful
speech argued for a recognition of an action for disgorgement of profits against a contract breaker where
four conditions are fulfilled. (1) There has been a breach of a negative stipulation. (2) The contract
breaker has obtained the profit by doing the very thing which he promised not to do. (3) The innocent
party (in this case the Crown as represented by the Attorney General) has a special interest over and
above the hope of a benefit to be assessed in monetary terms. (4) Specific performance or an injunction
is an ineffective or virtually ineffective remedy for the breach. The Solicitor General persuaded me that
in the case of Blake each of these conditions is satisfied. But since I recognise that it would be wrong to
create a remedy simply to cover this case, it is right that I should explain the specific considerations
which lead me to conclude that it is right on a principled basis to develop the law in a way which covers
this case and other cases sharing materially similar features.
My Lords, it has been held at first instance and in the Court of Appeal that Blake is not a fiduciary. This
is not an issue before the House. But, as my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, has
observed, thepresent case is closely analogous to that of fiduciaries: compare Reading v Attorney
General [1951] AC 507. If the information was still confidential, Blake would in my view have been
liable as a fiduciary. That would be so despite the fact that he left the intelligence services many years
ago. The distinctive feature of this case is, however, that Blake gave an undertaking not to divulge any
information, confidential or otherwise, obtained by him during his work in the intelligence services. This
obligation still applies to Blake. He was, therefore in regard to all information obtained by him in the
intelligence services, confidential or not, in a very similar position to a fiduciary. The reason of the rule
applying to fiduciaries applies to him. Secondly, I bear in mind that the enduring strength of the
common law is that it has been developed on a case-by-case basis by judges for whom the attainment of
practical justice was a major objective of their work. It is still one of the major moulding forces of
judicial decision-making. These observations are almost banal: the public would be astonished if it was
thought that judges did not conceive it as their prime duty to do practical justice whenever possible. A
recent example of this process at work is White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 where by a majority the House

of Lords held that a solicitor who caused loss to a third party by negligence in the preparation of a will is
liable in damages. Subordinating conceptual difficulties to the needs of practical justice a majority, and
notably Lord Goff of Chieveley, at pp 259-260, upheld the claim. For my part practical justice strongly
militates in favour of granting an order for disgorgement of profits against Blake. The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Snepp v United States, 444 US 507 is instructive. On very similar facts
the Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on the intelligence officer's profits. Our law is also
mature enough to provide a remedy in such a case but does so by the route of the exceptional
recognition of a claim for disgorgement of profits against the contract breaker. In my view therefore
there is a valid claim vesting in the Attorney General against Blake for disgorgement of his gain.
In view of these conclusions the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the granting of the injunction may
appear to be less important. But in a persuasive speech counsel for Blake has persuaded me that the
judgment of the Court of Appeal on this aspect cannot stand. First, in granting the injunction to prevent
Blake from receiving his royalties the Court of Appeal went significantly beyond the existing law
governing the powers of the Attorney General. Secondly, in this case it was unnecessary to do so
because the Attorney General in truth had a perfectly good private law remedy which he chose not to
invoke. Giving to a member of the executive unnecessary powers is never a good idea. One does not
know how such powers may be employed in future. Thirdly, the decision of the Court of Appeal is, in
any event, an order with confiscatory effect. Parliament has legislated for the circumstances in which the
profits of crime may be confiscated. An indispensable statutory requirement is a conviction for the
relevant offence: see Webb v Chief Constable of Mersey side Police [2000] QB 427. In this case the only
relevant offence could be the handing over by Blake of the manuscript to the publishers. He has not been
convicted of that offence. Given the limitations upon the power to confiscate carefully laid down by
Parliament it is a very strong thing for a court to create a power to confiscate directly or indirectly the
proceeds of crime. After all, theconstitutional function of the courts in creating law does not go beyond
filling spaces left vacant by Parliament. Lastly, it has been a longstanding principle of the common law
that, absent legislative authorisation, a court may not confiscate the property of a citizen: see Malone v
Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1980] QB 49; Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000]
QB 427, per May LJ, at pp 446-448, per Pill LJ, at p 449. This principle must also apply to a court
granting an injunction designed to have a confiscatory effect.
My Lords, for these reasons, as well as the detailed and far more compelling reasons given by Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead, I would make the order which he has proposed.
JUDGMENTBY-5: LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH
JUDGMENT-5:
LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH: . My Lords, when he opened this appeal, Mr Clayton, to
whose pro bono services on behalf of the appellant George Blake I, too, would wish to pay tribute,
warned your Lordships against being drawn into making bad law in order to enable an intuitively just
decision to be given against a traitor. It is therefore particularly important to be clear what are the facts
which have given rise to the Attorney General's claim in the present case. They are not materially in
dispute.
Between 1944 and 1961, Blake was employed by the Crown as a member of the Secret Intelligence
Service. As such he was subject to the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911. In August 1944 he
signed the requisite declaration under the Act. The declaration which he signed included the added
sentence:
"I understand that the above clauses [2 and 3] of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and 1920 cover also
articles published in the press and in book form and I undertake not to divulge any official information

x age i u u i / , 1

gained by me as a result of my employment either in the press or in book form."
It is common ground in the present case that these words amounted to a contractual undertaking by
Blake in favour of the Crown and that the Crown had a legitimate interest in asking for this undertaking
in aid of the criminal provisions quoted earlier in the document. It was not a commercial document and
its purpose was not to protect any commercial interest of the Crown or any right of the Crown
commercially to exploit such information. Its purpose and justification was to support and reinforce the
provisions of the criminal law to which Blake became subject by reason of his entering the employment
of the Crown and signing the statutory declaration. It is that justification which prevented the
undertaking from amounting to an unlawful restraint of trade and would now have to be relied upon to
justify the infringement of his freedom to impart information.
Blake had no regard for his duty of loyalty to his country and the Crown nor to his obligation to observe
the criminal law. Between 1951 and 1960, he disclosed valuable secrets to foreign agents. He was later
found out and in 1961 he was, on his own plea, convicted of five offences under the 1911 Act and
sentenced to 42 years' imprisonment. He escaped in 1966 and fled to Moscow.
In 1989, 28 years after his conviction, Blake entered into an agreement with Jonathan Cape Ltd, an
English company, to publish a book to be written by him about his life from 1944 onwards. He delivered
themanuscript by the end of that year and the book was published in September 1990.
The Government however did not take any action against the publishers Jonathan Cape even though the
Government knew of the existence of the book before it was published. Neither Blake nor anyone else
had sought the Government's permission for the publication. It is accepted that, by delivering the
manuscript to Jonathan Cape, Blake committed an offence under the 1911 Act (or its successor, the 1989
Act) and broke the contractual undertaking which he had given in 1944. It is also accepted that in 1989
and 1990, had it chosen to do so, the Crown could have applied for an injunction to restrain the
publication of the book and would probably have been successful. Had the court decided in its discretion
not to grant an injunction at that time, one or more of the remedies alternative to an injunction could
have been considered and, if thought appropriate, adopted. The present litigation has only come about
because the Crown chose not to take that course at that time.
The reason why in May 1991 these proceedings were started was because the Crown had learnt of the
size of the advance royalty which Jonathan Cape had agreed to pay Blake. It was about oe 150,000. The
size of this royalty was accounted for not by any new facts contained in the book. The contents of the
book were, as summarised in the agreed statement of facts, fairly unremarkable. Parts did relate to his
activities as a secret service officer but by 1989 none of the information was any longer confidential nor
was it alleged that it would damage the public interest. The size of the royalty was attributable to his
notoriety as an infamous spy. The Crown thought that it was wrong that he should be allowed to enjoy
the substantial sum which resulted from the publication of the book. Blake had escaped his just
punishment for his crimes. There was no prospect of ever bringing him back into the jurisdiction and
make him serve out his prison sentence. Now that he had an asset within the jurisdiction, that at least
should be withheld from him; the asset had a connection with the crimes which he had committed.
The remarkable history of the proceedings thereafter has been already described by my noble and
learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. The claim to the royalties was originally made on
recognised proprietary and fiduciary principles. If applicable they would have given the Crown the
private law remedy they sought, an order for the taking of an account and the payment over of the sums
found due. But this claim could not be sustained on the facts. Too much time had elapsed since 1960.
There was no longer anything which was confidential or which would damage the public interest; he no
longer had any fiduciary relationship to the Crown. Sir Richard Scott V-C dismissed the action. The

Crown appealed. Its appeal failed but before it was dismissed a new line was adopted with the
encouragement of the court and leave to amend was given.
The public law claim was made. This relied upon the role of the Attorney General as an officer of the
Crown responsible for assisting in upholding the criminal law. In this capacity it is open to him to apply
for an injunction. He sought, and after a further hearing the court granted him, an interim injunction to
restrain the payment of the remaining royalty money (about oe90,000) to Blake. However, perhaps
conscious that this order might be open to criticism, the court in its judgment tentatively raised a further
possibility-restitutionary damages.
Blake has now appealed to your Lordships' House against the grant of the injunction. Like all of your
Lordships, I agree that the grant of the injunction was wrong and should be set aside. But the Crown has,
with your Lordships' encouragement and leave, cross-appealed to make the private law claim to
restitutionary damages which it had previously declined to make. Your Lordships have concluded that
this claim should be allowed.
I cannot join your Lordships in that conclusion. I have two primary difficulties. The first is the facts of
the present case. The speech of my noble and learned friend explores what is the "just response" to the
defendant's conduct. The "just response" visualised in the present case is, however it is formulated, that
Blake should be punished and deprived of any fruits of conduct connected with his former criminal and
reprehensible conduct. The Crown have made no secret of this. It is not a commercial claim in support
of any commercial interest. It is a claim relating to past criminal conduct. The way it was put by the
Court of Appeal [1998] Ch 439, 464 was:
"The ordinary member of the public would be shocked if the position was that the courts were powerless
to prevent [Blake] profiting from his criminal conduct."
The answer given by my noble and learned friend does not reflect the essentially punitive nature of the
claim and seeks to apply principles of law which are only appropriate where commercial or proprietary
interests are involved. Blake has made a financial gain but he has not done so at the expense of the
Crown or making use of any property of or commercial interest of the Crown either in law or equity.
My second difficulty is that the reasoning of my noble and learned friend depends upon the conclusion
that there is some gap in the existing state of the law which requires to be filled by a new remedy. He
accepts that the term "restitutionary damages" is unsatisfactory but, with respect, does not fully examine
why this is so, drawing the necessary conclusions.
The cross-appeal has to be determined on the basis that the only civil cause of action which the Crown
has against Blake is a bare legal cause of action in contract for breach of contract in that he failed in
1989 to observe the negative undertaking which he gave in 1944. As already observed, it is recognised
by Blake that the Crown had at the least a good arguable case for the grant of an injunction against him
at that time. In other words it was a breach of contract-breach of a negative undertaking-liable to be
restrained by injunction, ie, specifically enforced.
But the Crown did not apply for an injunction at the time it would have done some good and quite
probably stopped the publication of the book. This is the source of the problems for the Crown in
achieving its purpose in bringing these proceedings. It cannot say that it intends to prosecute Blake
because it does not expect that he will ever return to this country; consequently it admits that it cannot
say that it will ever be in a position to make use of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and
the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995. It does not say that the payment of the oe90,000 by Jonathan Cape to
Blake would amount to the commission of any criminal offence by either Jonathan Cape or Blake. It
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accepts that it has no direct right of recourse against Jonathan Cape; it is confined to claiming some
public law or private law remedy against Blake. It now accepts that its original claim that it has
equitable or fiduciary or proprietary rights againstBlake cannot be sustained. It cannot claim
compensatory damages for breach of contract because it has suffered no loss as a result of the
publication.
What then was left? First there was the public law claim to an interim injunction as awarded by the
Court of Appeal. Second there now is the claim not made as such in the Court of Appeal but now fully
argued in your Lordships' House as a cross-appeal by the Crown for restitutionary damages.
The public law claim
I agree that the decision of the Court of Appeal cannot be sustained. I agree with the reasoning of my
noble and learned friends save in so far as it seeks to pray in aid their conclusion on the cross-appeal.
The injunction was granted in aid of preserving a power later to confiscate the relevant sum of money.
The Attorney General has the locus standi to make such an application. He did not seek to rely on Chief
Constable of Kent v V [1983] QB 34 and there has been no need to consider that case. The reason why
the grant of the injunction cannot be sustained is that there is no common law power to confiscate as
such the earnings of even convicted criminals (Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr [1980] QB 49) and,
if there was any such power, the field is now fully occupied by statutory provisions which proceed on
the basis that there is no such general power and make express and defined provision for a qualified
grant of such a power (cf Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508). The Crown
accepted that it could not realistically say that it would ever be in a position to invoke the statutory
powers. The injunction was an interim one and unless it is in support of some sustainable further remedy
it was wrong in principle and must be set aside.
The private law claim: restitutionary damages
It is with some hesitation that I enter upon this field at all in view of your Lordships' so far unanimous
opinion save so as to record my dissent. The subject is a profound one which has attracted much
attention among the academic writers for some time. Neither the subject nor the opinions of my noble
and learned friends, Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn, could be done justice in many fewer pages than their
opinions will occupy. However I do not believe that it is helpful (or courteous to Mr Clayton) that I
should add nothing at all. Exceptional though this case is, courts hereafter will have to consider its
relevance to the decisions of other cases which will surely come before them. I will however confine
myself to what I regard as the minimum of explanatory comment (with the inevitable consequence of
some simplification).
The concepts of restitution and compensation are not the same though they will on occasions fulfil the
same need. Restitution is analogous to property: it concerns wealth or advantage which ought to be
returned or transferred by the defendant to the plaintiff. It is a form of specific implement. Its clearest
form is an order for the return or transfer of property which belongs in law or in equity to the plaintiff.
Property includes an interest in property. Then there are rights recognised in equity such as those which
arise from a fiduciary relationship. These rights give rise torestitutionary remedies including the remedy
of account which, depending on the circumstances, could also derive from a common law relationship
such as agency. Then, again, there are the rights now grouped under the heading of the law of restitution
or unjust enrichment. These are still truly restitutionary concepts leading to restitutionary remedies.
Typically they require the payment of money by the person unjustly enriched to the person at whose
expense that enrichment has taken place. In so far as the appropriate remedy is the payment of money or
the delivery up of a chattel or goods is concerned the common law could provide it; insofar as it required
some other remedy or the recognition of an equitable right, the chancery jurisdiction had to be invoked.

The essential of such rights and their enforcement was the procuring by the courts of the performance by
the defendant of his obligations. The plaintiff recovers what he is actually entitled to not some monetary
substitute for it. If what the plaintiff is entitled to is wealth expressed in monetary terms, the order will
be for the payment of money but this does not alter the character of the remedy or of the right being
recognised. He gets the money because it was his property or he was in some other way entitled to it. It
is still the enforced performance of an obligation. The same is the case where an injunction is granted or
a decree of specific performance or the ordering of an account.
It is this class of rights which the Crown is unable to invoke as a result of the judgment of Sir Richard
Scott V-C upheld by the Court of Appeal. There is no obligation of Blake left to perform or which now
can be enforced. That time passed with the failure to apply for an injunction in 1989 or 1990. The
Crown has no right to an injunction to stop the payment of the royalty to Blake and procure its payment
to the Crown instead. The Crown has no right to the royalty and does not now assert one.
The law, including equity, provides extensive and effective remedies for protecting and enforcing
property rights. It is no criticism of the law that they are not available now to the Crown. The Crown
does not have the substantive rights to support such remedies.
Two further points need to be briefly mentioned. There are cases which are treated as so closely
analogous to proprietary rights that they are covered by remedies which are appropriate to such rights.
The contractual right in Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American Telegraph Co Ltd [1912] AC 555
was held to have created a trust. In Reading v Attorney General [1951] AC 507, restitutionary remedies
were awarded against an army sergeant who used his army uniform and army vehicle to enable him to
assist smugglers. The money he was paid by the smugglers was held to be money for which he must
account to his employer in the same way as if he had received a bribe: see per Asquith LJ in the Court of
Appeal. These cases would have assisted the Crown had they succeeded on the facts before Sir Richard
Scott V-C. The other point is that where a court declines to grant an injunction it may award damages in
lieu. This does not alter the principles which are applicable nor does it provide the Crown with a remedy
in the present case; but it is relevant to the understanding of the authorities.
The Crown has to allege a breach of contract. This is not a claim to the performance of any obligation
save in the sense used by Lord Diplock that contractual obligations are correctly understood as being the
obligation to perform or pay damages for failing to do so-the primary and secondaryobligation: Photo
Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. The claim is for damages in order to put the
plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been performed. It is a substitute for performance.
That is why it is necessarily compensatory. The error is to describe compensation as relating to a loss as
if there has to be some identified physical or monetary loss to the plaintiff. In the vast majority of cases
this error does not matter because the plaintiffs claim can be so described without distortion. But in a
minority of cases the error does matter and cases of the breach of negative promises typically illustrate
this category.
But, before coming to them, I would like to refer to Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth
[1996] AC 344. This was the case of the swimming pool. The defendant had contracted to build for the
plaintiff a swimming pool of a specified depth. The pool was not of that depth. The defendant had
broken his contract. The plaintiff was entitled to damages. The value of his property was affected either
not at all or only marginally. The swimming pool was serviceable. But the plaintiff was entitled to a
deeper pool. The prima facie measure of damages would have been the cost of increasing the depth of
the pool to the stipulated depth-a considerable sum. But this sum was so disproportionate that the courts
refused to award it. It would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to incur that expense. His damages must be
assessed at a lower figure. The speech of Lord Mustill, at pp 359-361, is illuminating. The loss is a
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reasonable valuation of what the plaintiff ought to have had but did not get. It is not just the amount (if
any) by which his property has a lower market value than that it would have had if the contract had been
performed. In the present case, by 1989, Blake's undertaking had no remaining value to the Crown.
The question of negative covenants typically arise in relation to land and covenants not to build. A
complication is that they usually involve a proprietary right of the plaintiff which he is prima facie
entitled to enforce as such. Where the plaintiff has failed to obtain or failed to apply for an injunction, he
has to be content with a remedy in damages. What has happened in such cases is that there has either
actually or in effect been a compulsory purchase of the plaintiffs right of refusal. (The award of
damages in tort for the conversion or detinue of goods is also an example of compulsory purchase as is
demonstrated by the common law rule that the payment of the damages vests the title in the goods in the
defendant.) What the plaintiff has lost is the sum which he could have exacted from the defendant as the
price of his consent to the development. This is an example of compensatory damages. They are
damages for breach. They do not involve any concept of restitution and so to describe them is an error.
The error comes about because of the assumption that the only loss which the plaintiff can have suffered
is a reduction in the value of the dominant tenement. It is for this reason that I agree with my noble and
learned friend, Lord Nicholls, that the decision in Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd
[1974] 1 WLR 798 is to be preferred to that in Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1
WLR 1361: see also Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269.1 would however add that the order proposed
by your Lordships does not reflect this principle; it goes further. It does not award to the Crown
damages for breach of contract assessed by reference to what would be the reasonable price to pay for
permission to publish. It awards the Crown damages which equal the whole amount owed by Jonathan
Cape to Blake. That is a remedy based on proprietary principles when the necessary proprietary rights
are absent.
The principle of compensation is both intellectually sound as the remedy for breach and provides the
just answer. The examples discussed in my noble and learned friend's speech do not on the correct
analysis disclose the supposed need to extend the boundaries of remedies for breach of contract. The
reason why the Crown should not recover damages in the present case derives from the exceptional
public law nature of the undertaking which Blake gave. If the relationship had been a commercial one it
is probable that by 1989 the undertaking would be regarded as spent or no longer enforcible, but if still
enforcible the breach of it would have supported compensatory damages on the "compulsory purchase"
basis.
The examples given by my noble and learned friend are examples of compensatory damages. Lord
Halsbury's dining-room chair is no different unless the error which I have identified is made. He would
have lost the use of the chair and it, like other such amenity-value assets, can be assessed by reference to
the sum which has been expended on its acquisition and/or maintenance or interest upon its capital value
during the period of deprivation. The supposed problem arises from asking the wrong question not from
receiving the wrong answer.
I must also sound a further note of warning that if some more extensive principle of awarding noncompensatory damages for breach of contract is to be introduced into our commercial law the
consequences will be very far reaching and disruptive. I do not believe that such is the intention of your
Lordships but if others are tempted to try to extend the decision of the present exceptional case to
commercial situations so as to introduce restitutionary rights beyond those presently recognised by the
law of restitution, such a step will require very careful consideration before it is acceded to.
My Lords, Mr Clayton was right to say that the exceptional facts of this case have been critical to its
decision. The policy which is being enforced is that which requires Blake to be punished by depriving
him of any benefit from anything connected with his past deplorable criminal conduct. Your Lordships

consider that this policy can be given effect to without a departure from principle. I must venture to
disagree. I would allow the appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal.
DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Declaration that Attorney General entitled to be paid by defendant sum equal to whatever amount was
due and owing to defendant from publisher under publishing agreement of May 1989.

